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Executive Summary
In 1994, Massachusetts passed legislation restricting localities from enacting rent
control. California followed suit in 1995. This paper examines the struggle over rent control
in these two states. It begins with an overview of key concepts from the literature in political
science, sociology, and public policy, focusing on the major institutional, political, and
ideological factors necessary to analyze the mobilization of resources for and against public
policy. This is followed by a brief history of rent control in the United States, focusing on
the role of political mobilization by tenants, landlords, and their respective allies. A history
of rent control and a description of the recent politics of deregulation in Massachusetts and
California reveals the political calculations of tenants, landlords, and allies in these two
states. The next section of the paper analyzes the major factors involved in the real estate
industry's successful campaign to defeat or weaken rent regulations at the state level in these
two states. It focuses on the various strategies used by the real estate industry and the
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tenants' organizations, the mobilization of "third parties," the role of the media and public
opinion, and other factors. 
The final section reviews the consequences of deregulation in these two states. It is
reasonable to argue that rent deregulation had already taken effect in California and
Massachusetts by the late l970s and early 1980s. The major cities in both states had already
adopted vacancy decontrol policies (or no rent regulations at all).  A key observation,
therefore, is that the overall number of units subject to decontrol, compared with the private
rental housing inventory in those metro housing markets and statewide, is quite
insignificant. (This is in contrast to New York City, for example, where regulated units
comprise a significant proportion of the city's and metro area's private rental housing
inventory). Within the particular localities, however, deregulation will certainly increase
hardship. The paper uses several kinds of data to indicate the possible short-term and long-
term consequences. But because the laws in both states were designed to be gradually
phased-in, it is impossible to make definitive statements about their consequences, either for
sitting tenants or for the availability of affordable housing.  
Introduction
In 1994, Massachusetts passed legislation restricting localities from enacting rent
control. California followed suit in 1995.1  Both states limited localities to enacting vacancy
decontrol, which allows apartment owners to raise rents to market levels when a tenant
leaves.2  Vacancy decontrol is, in effect, a method of gradually eliminating rent control as
tenant turnover eventually allows owners to increase rents to market levels. The
Massachusetts law eliminates even vacancy decontrol after two years. In both cases, only a
few cities were directly impacted. In Massachusetts, only Boston, Cambridge, and
Brookline had any form of rent control; Boston and Brookline had already watered-down
their laws to versions of vacancy decontrol.3 In California, only five cities -- Santa Monica,
West Hollywood, Berkeley, East Palo Alto, and Cotati -- had rent control; nine others,
including San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, and Los Angeles, already had vacancy
decontrol.
The real estate industry had been trying to pre-empt local rent regulations in both
states since the l970s, when cities in both states began to adopt rent controls. They had tried
a number of strategies over the years, but had consistently fallen short. What accounts for
this dramatic turnabout? This paper examines that question, focusing on the political
maneuverings of both pro- and anti-rent control forces in both states, looking for differences
and similarities in the two states. The paper also briefly examines the consequences of this
policy shift in several housing market areas. A thorough analysis of the impacts of
deregulation cannot be done until more time has elapsed. Implementation of the
Massachusetts law began in January 1995, while implementation of the California law
began in January 1996, although both laws phase-in the implementation. 
Key Concepts
Formal and informal political institutions, rules, and players play a key role in
shaping the outcome of public policy contests. Whether through the referendum or the
legislative process, they have a major influence in who wins and loses in terms of society's
distribution of benefits. Key features of our political system -- the parties, the courts, the
system of checks and balances, the role of money in campaigns, the rules governing voter
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registration, the ground rules for elections and ballot measures -- shape the outcome of
public policy contests.4 
Among western democracies, the United States relies most heavily on private market
forces to house its population. In fact, despite our laissez-faire ideology, government is a
powerful player in the housing market. This doesn't mean that the government is not
involved in housing matters, but that American policy emphasizes bolstering market forces
and minimizing assistance for the poor.  Government's role dates primarily from two major
turning points in our housing history. First, at the turn of the century, tenement reform laws
set the precedent that loc l government would set standards and regulate housing safety.
Second, during the l930s, the public housing program and banking reforms established the
federal role in expanding homeownership and providing subsidies to the poor. 
 One of the most important but often overlooked concepts for understanding the battle
over rent control is the role of federalism -- the way responsibility for public policy is
divided between federal, state, county, and local governments.5 Responsibility for
implementing these policies is diffuse. Housing policy in the United States is made by a
complex mosaic of federal, state, county, and municipal government. Government is quite
involved in housing matters, including zoning, enforcing building code standards and health
and safety standards, regulating rents and evictions, monitoring racial discrimination,
insuring the banking system, operating a secondary mortgage market to promote
homeownership, and providing tax and subsidy incentives for investors, owners, and
consumers. 
In the case of rent control, most (though not all) states require localities to seek
permission (or "home rule" authority) to regulate rents and evictions. As a result, there is a
wide disparity in terms of whether and how localities choose (or are allowed to) regulate
rental housing. There are no federal mandates or requirements.6 States ca  pre-empt
localities from regulating rental housing, but they cannot require it. Even the federal
government plays a role, not only in terms of whether it allows localities to regulate housing
that have federal subsidies, but also whether it seeks to reward, punish, or remain neutral
toward cities that adopt rent regulations. Political interest groups that are adept at
maneuvering within the federalist system -- in other words, that can mobilize its resources at
different levels of government (often simultaneously) to gain the most leverage -- will have
an advantage in influencing public policy.
In simple terms, the battle between tenants and landlords can be viewed as a contest
between organized people and organized money. Although a democracy is supposed to
operate on the principle of "one person, one vote," it is obvious that the political playing
field is far from level. The distribution of wealth and income in the United States is highly
unequal. The disparity in financial resources gives some groups disproportionate influence
in getting their voices heard and gaining access to political decision-makers. This does not
guarantee that they will get everything they seek, but it does mean that they have an
advantage. The political system is generally skewed toward those with economic wealth.
In general, tenants significantly outnumber landlords. If sheer numbers alone
accounted for political influence, renters would be a powerful political force. For a variety
of reasons, explored in detail below, renters have generally not been able to take meaningful
advantage of their numerical edge. In part this is because tenants are disproportionately
poor, which is generally associated with low levels of political participation. It is also
because tenants are typically not very well-organized while their opponents (at least on the
issue of rent control and other regulations), the real estate industry, are very well-organized.
Concentrated among the poor, tenant organizing has inherent limitations. They generally
move a lot (often because of eviction for non-payment of rent), vote infrequently, live from
crisis to crisis, and lack the disposable income to pay steady dues to a tenants' organization.
Resources from government and liberal foundations usually last only as long as tenants
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protest and disrupt "business as usual," but such activities are hard to sustain. 
Sociologists have coined the phrase "resource mobilization" t  explain how social
injustice or even widespread discontent, on their own, do not inevitably lead to social
protest or to changes in public policy.7 From this perspective, the key factor in explaining
effective protest is not simply the level of discontent or the motivation to organize, but how
well discontented groups create opportunities to change their situation. In other words, it is
important to examine both the internal dynamics of self-help efforts by disadvantaged
constituencies and the ext rnal environment and resources that these constituencies can draw
upon to effect change in public policy. The resource mobilization perspective focuses
particular attention on how groups marshall organizational resources. It looks at such issues
as leadership, strategic thinking, recruitment of new members, raising money, and
influencing the media. Success depends not only on mobilizing the "base" but also on
building coalitions with allies and converting neutral "third parties" into allies or
sympathizers. When the discontent is among people with few material resources of their
own, they have to enlist external resources from "third parties" who help pressure the
targets of protest to negotiate and/or make concessions to the protesters. 
Disadvantaged groups have at least three strategic approaches or channels available
to them. Some approaches are considered more "acceptable" than others in terms of whether
they are primarily "inside" or "outside" the normal rules of political participation. Of course,
definitions of acceptable political behavior ebb and flow over time. Generally, however, the
three main approaches, in their order of acceptability, are: electoral, lobbying, and protest. 
Groups can endorse candidates, recruit people to work in election campaigns, and
mobilize people to vote as a "bloc" in elections, hoping that their numbers are adequate to be
considered a key constituency by officeholders.  Whether or not they participate in elections,
they can lobby for legislation by attending and testifying at public hearings, meeting with
office holders, writing articles and letters to newspapers, appearing on TV and radio shows,
and trying to generate publicity and pressure for their cause. Finally, they can engage in a
variety of protest tactics -- from rallies, to rent strikes, to civil disobedience. To be effective,
however, protest must be seen as legitimate and "moral." Riots and spontaneous rebellions
rarely elicit widescale public sympathy. But organized protest, including civil disobedience,
can often invoke sympathy if participants are viewed as protesting for a "just" cause,
particularly if the public thinks they have exhausted other means to have their voices heard.
Finally, all debates over public policy occur within an ideological climate.  This
climate sets the boundaries of public debate and discussion. Academics and journalists
discuss this in terms of the public's "mood" about particular issues or about broader
concerns such as the proper role of government in society. Public opinion plays an
important role in some, though not all, public policy battles. If public opinion is indifferent
or ambivalent about an issue, then the public policy battle will be fought out primarily by the
groups directly affected by the policy.
The news media play a key role in shaping the ideological climate. The media helps
set the agenda of public debate. It may not influence what people think, but it influences
what people think about. In other words, it helps determine whether an issue is "hot," and
therefore worthy of scrutiny and analysis. In some cases, however, the media does
influence how people view an issue. While the media may not sway people with strong
beliefs to change their views, they may influence the views of people who were indifferent
or ambivalent to take sides. 
Even if an issue is not salient to the broad public, it can be critical to key people and
institutions who may be indirectly involved. In particular, by either ignoring or drawing
attention to an issue, the media can influence how third parties -- government officials,
elected officeholders, targets of protest, or potential allies -- respond to an issue.8 The
cliche, "what if we organize a demonstration and no media come?" tells part of this story.
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Equally important is how the media "frame" an issue in terms of what is considered "fair"
and "reasonable" versus what is considered "extreme" or "radical."  If protest demands
appear foolish, trivial, or extreme when they are voiced, they are unlikely to be taken
seriously by decision-makers. In other words, the media can influence whether a group's
concerns are considered l gitimate.9
The ability to set the public agenda is not always visible to observers of the political
scene. It often comes in the form of "non-decision making."10 This occurs when individuals
or groups have the power to keep certain issues from emerging as public controversies -- to
keep some matters off the agenda -- thus preventing challenges to the dominant values or
interests. Non-decision making is a way to suffocate demands for change before they are
even voiced. From this perspective, "doing nothing" is actually a form of political behavior
with real consequences. Some political scientists argue that the entire political system is
skewed to protect dominant interests, so that challenges to existing power arrangements are
viewed as illegitimate or "extreme." This is sometimes called the "mobilization of bias"
within the system, "a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional
procedures...that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of others."11 I  other
words, some groups can maintain their privileged position in society without having to exert
themselves. Only when disadvantaged groups disrupt "business as usual" and inject their
concerns onto the agenda do powerful groups have to utilize their resources in the political
arena to protect their position. 
Political scientists have devoted substantial analysis to the ways that powerful
groups exercise influence informally, through parallel institutions (sometimes called
"shadow governments") and social networks. These include participation in the governance
and funding of universities, think tanks, policy-planning organizations, foundations,
journals, and other institutions that can help shape the public agenda.12 If one side has
access to research and the capacity to circulate ideas through the media, and the other side
does not (or not to the same extent), this represents a political advantage in shaping the
agenda, the ideological climate, and the outcome of public policy.
This does not mean that relatively powerless groups cannot influence public policy,
but that doing so requires them to be better organized and jump through more hoops than is
required of people with greater material resources. We will employ these concepts in
examining the battle over rent control in California and Massachusetts. 
The Battle Over Rent Control
Americans have long cherished home ownership as a key element of the “American
dream.”  Being a propertyless tenant has never been part of that dream. In the United States,
housing is symbolized by the freestanding single-family home.  Furthermore, a deeply
rooted national belief in the sanctity of the “unfettered marketplace” has an especially strong
claim in the housing sector which, perhaps more than any other economic arena, is seen as
embodying individual choice unrestrained by the hand of government.  In theory (though
not in reality), the government enters the picture only as a last resort. 
Renters, unable to afford their own home, face many problems: the threat of
eviction, unaffordable and rising rents, and poorly-maintained buildings. As a result, the
struggle between tenant and landlord has been a persistent one in American history. But
only occasionally has this conflict taken organized or political form -- from struggles to
extend the franchise, to land seizures and protests over evictions, to campaigns for code
enforcement and rent controls. 
Modern tenant consciousness and activism began in the late 1800s with the rise of
the industrial city and the emergence of tenants as a majority of the population in central
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cities.13  Tenant consciousness and activism reached peaks at the turn of the 20th century,
after World War One and during the Depression -— all periods of economic crisis and
housing shortages. 
From the 1870s through the 1960s, tenant activism was found primarily among the
poor and working class crowded into tenements and slums in the large industrial cities.
Most tenant groups dealt with immediate crises in their own buildings -- evictions, lack of
heat, rent increases, dilapidation -- with the landlords as targets of protest. In l908, New
York City tenants organized a citywide rent strike, but it was short-lived because judges
quickly evicted the participants. At times, these groups developed the stability and coherence
to join together and direct tenant protest toward local government to force it to enact and
enforce building codes and other reforms. Only in New York City, however, were tenants
able to win rent control, which was initiated in 1920. There, citywide tenant groups aligned
themselves with trade unions, radical political groups, and elected city officials who
addressed working class problems. 
Beginning at the turn of the century, tenant groups were also aided by middle-class
reformers who worked on behalf of tenement dwellers. These reformers were not directly
part of grassroots tenants groups, but their efforts -- conducting studies of slum conditions
and lobbying for the establishment of city departments to inspect buildings and enforce
codes -- helped to publicize tenants' grievances and legitimize their protests.14 
In the Depression, tenant groups were organized in most major cities by radicals as
part of their efforts to mobilize and politicize industrial workers and the unemployed. One of
their favorite tactics was to block evictions by bringing large crowds to confront landlords
or the police at the doorstep, making it impossible to remove the tenants and their
possessions.  One of the largest rent strikes in the nation's history occurred in New York
City in l932.
During and immediately after World War 2, tenant activism slowed down. During
the war, labor unions and other protest groups united behind the war effort and tempered
their protests. Because of the wartime housing emergency, Congress enacted nationwide
rent controls which lasted until 1947. When President Truman lifted rent controls, tenants in
New York City fought to have the local government enact a rent control program of its own.
For the next 20 years, it was the only city with rent control. Even there, tenants had to
organize to keep the city from abandoning the program. In the rest of the country, however,
there was a lull in tenant activism until the l960s.  Housing conditions for most Americans
improved dramatically. The percentage of tenants in the population dropped from 56% in
1940, to 45% in 1950, to 38% in 1960. During this period of rising affluence, American
homes got bigger and bigger, with more and more appliances, more patios and porches,
more garden and lawn space. This upsurge in homeownership created a strong belief that all
except the very poor would soon realize the dream. As a result, working class and middle
class tenants had little stake in their roles as tenants. For the most part, they saw themselves
as soon-to-be homeowners, so there was little incentive to organize around rent hikes or
building problems. The tenants left behind in the cities during the postwar boom were
disproportionately the poor and the minorities, but the nation showed little concern for the
plight of these groups.
The 1960s saw another wave of tenant consciousness and activism.  This period
differed from previous ones in that it was not a period of economic crisis or of a severe
housing shortage. It was a spill-over from the civil rights and poor people's movements, all
of which developed in the context of “rising expectations.”  It was also a spillover of the
student movement. Tenant organizations and rent strikes emerged in such college towns as
Berkeley, Madison, Ann Arbor, and Cambridge, and in nearby cities (such as Boston and
San Francisco) where student activists mixed with a low-income population. It was not until
1964 that the civil rights movement turned north and began to address problems like
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housing discrimination and slum conditions. It was no accident that the revitalized tenant
movement began with the Harlem rent strikes of l964-1965. According to some accounts,
the strikes involved more than 500 buildings and 15,000 tenants, led by charismatic Jesse
Grey.15 They received nationwide attention and helped inspire tenant activism in other
cities, primarily among low-income blacks. Out of these efforts developed the first
nationwide group, the National Tenants' Organization (NTO). Formed in l969, it had within
two years affiliates in most large and medium-size cities. The NTO was concerned primarily
with problems in public housing, but also with private slum housing. The NTO's heyday
lasted only until the early 1970s, when internal conflict, declining foundation funding, and
the waning of the civil rights movement undermined the organization's strength.
The activism of the 1960s focused on a number of issues: opposition to bulldozer-
style urban renewal; code enforcement; and expanding tenants' rights law, such as state
"warrant of habitability" law and protection against arbitrary evictions. Tenants in both
private and government-subsidized housing mobilized to defend and expand their rights. 
The 1968 report of the Kerner Commission found that housing problems among
low-income tenants was the primary grievance behind the mid-1960s ghetto rebellions.
Riots in most major cities led Washington to enact an anti-poverty program that included
funds for organizers and legal services lawyers, housing rehabilitation and rent subsidies.
These funds provided significant resources for tenant groups and helped fuel tenant
activism.  But the tenant activism of the 1960s failed to build on its successes. It developed
few stable tenant organizations with active members. Concentrated among the poor, the
tenants movement had inherent limitations. They moved a lot (often because of eviction for
non-payment of rent), they voted infrequently, they lived from crisis to crisis, and they
lacked the disposable income to pay steady dues to a tenants' organization. Resources from
government and liberal foundations lasted only as long as tenants protested and disrupted
business as usual. 
The 1960s wave of tenant activism indicates some of the strengths and weaknesses
of the tenants' movement. It also shows some of the ways that well-organized tenants can
influence government. The tenants' movement then was primarily a protest movement
among the poor, especially African-Americans. As in early periods, they were aided by
middle-class reformers, primarily students and radical lawyers. Suspicious of direct
involvement in electoral politics (such as running candidates and registering voters) the
movement primarily engaged in public protest demonstrations and rent strikes. Despite this
aversion to electoral politics, tenants played a role in the emergence of a growing number of
black local officials, including mayors, during the late l960s and early l970s. To win office,
they had to appeal to the problems facing the black poor, which included housing
conditions. 
The l960s wave of tenant activism produced some important legacies. It improved
housing and living conditions for many low-income tenants. Tenant-landlord law was
reformed. These reforms represented the first significant change in tenant-landlord law since
the turn of the century.16  Also, issues such as housing segregation, welfare rights, voting
rights, rent subsidies, and tenant involvement in public housing management were placed on
the political agenda and reforms were introduced, even if all the problems were not solved.
Finally, this wave of activism developed a large nucleus of trained tenant organizers and
advocate planners (such as Urban Planning Aid in Boston) who were ready and waiting
when conditions would make another wave of activism possible. 
   Rent control was a key part of the tenant movement's agenda. By the l970s and early
1980s, about 200 cities -— in New York State (including New York City), Massachusetts
(including Boston), California (including Los Angeles and San Francisco), New Jersey
(about 100 communities), Maryland, and Washington, D.C. -—  had adopted some form of
rent control. By the early 1980s, about 10 percent of the nation's renters were covered by
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rent regulations, but they were concentrated in a few locations. New York City alone had
39% of all rent controlled units; Los Angeles had another 17%.
During those years, tenant activists and real estate groups fought brushfire battles at
the local level.  Landlords and their allies poured millions of dollars to pass referenda, or
enact legislation, to stem the tide of municipally-sanctioned rent limits, but the battle ended
in a stalemate. During the l980s, tenant activists were unable to add many new cities to the
localities that had already adopted rent control, but real estate groups couldn't beat back any
of the existing laws either. In some big cities, progressive candidates like Ray Flynn in
Boston, Art Agnos in San Francisco, and Anthony Cucci in Jersey City vaulted into the
mayor's office as champions of tenants' rights and rent control. In smaller cities, such as
Santa Monica, Berkeley, and Cambridge, pro-rent control electoral forces won majorities in
city government and shaped the direction of broad public policy. 
Tenant activism developed steadily, although unevenly, during the 1970s and
1980s. By the end of the 1970s, building-level tenant groups existed in every city and many
suburbs. Citywide tenant organizations could be found in most localities with a significant
renter population. In 1975, tenant leaders founded Shelterforce magazine, to report on and
encourage tenant activism and to give the movement a sense of identity and coordination. By
the early 1980s, statewide tenant organizations existed in New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Illinois, and California. 
In 1979, more than 100 tenant leaders from 50 cities and 17 states met in Newark.
The initial impetus for the meeting was to prepare a response to the possibility of President
Jimmy Carter imposing wage and price control to address the nation's skyrocketing
inflation. Tenant leaders wanted to be ready with a package of rent and eviction regulations
to incorporate into any federal legislation. Although the Carter administration backed down
from price controls, the Newark meeting set the stage for a national network of tenant
activists. A year later, at a conference in Cleveland, tenant activists formed the National
Tenants Union (NTU), which was based at the Shelterforce office in New Jersey. For
several years, the NTU helped coordinate tenant movement activities, primarily to fight
Reagan Administration and Congressional attempts to pre-empt local and state rent control
laws. NTU never developed a stable funding base or a cohesive coordinating strategy and
collapsed by the mid-l980s. 
In addition to neighborhood, citywide, statewide, and national groups devoted
exclusively to tenant concerns, many of the grassroots community organizations that
mushroomed in the 1970s and early 1980s in low-income and working-class neighborhoods
embraced tenant organizing as part of their multi-issue agendas. Many of these local groups
were linked to national organizing networks such as ACORN, Citizen Action, National
People's Action, and the Industrial Areas Foundation, which provided training for
organizers and leaders. These local multi-issue groups did not focus exclusively on tenants'
issues, but their concern with the problems of older urban neighborhoods necessitated some
interest in tenant issues. The l970s and l980s also saw an increase in organizing among
senior citizens. Many activist senior-citizen organizations (such as the Gray Panthers,
Massachusetts Senior Action, and others) made tenant problems one of their priorities,
reflecting the worsening housing situation among older Americans on fixed incomes.17
Tenant activism through the late l970s focused primarily on renters in privately-
owned apartment complexes. The issues primarily involved rent increases, condo
conversion, and building conditions. During those years, many metropolitan areas had
experienced some level of "condomania" -- the conversion of apartments to condominiums,
leading to widespread displacement. Many tenants, unable to afford the price of condos, but
with difficulty finding other housing in a tight rental market, mobilized to support laws to
delay evictions by requiring a year or more notice, prohibit evictions or conversions 
altogether, or require tenant approval before conversions could proceed. By the early l980s,
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some form of tenant protection against condo conversion had been passed in 24 states and
the District of Columbia. 
During this period, landlords also developed greater cohesiveness and coordination
to stem the tide (or the threat) of rent control and condominium conversion control laws
around the country. Homebuilders, mortgage bankers and real estate agents have long been
influential in local, state and national politics. But apartment developers and owners had
been more fragmented.  Not surprisingly, landlords have been particularly well organized in
New York City (where rent control existed for decades) and have sought to weaken or
abolish rent regulation.  Where tenants have been most active, landlords have banded
together, often under the aegis of the local Chamber of Commerce or Real Estate Board.  
Increasingly, however, landlords developed their own networks and organizations. 
Real estate groups are among the largest contributors to both the national political
campaigns. In 1978, the National Rental Housing Council was formed to provide local
landlord groups with advice on media campaigns, legal tactics, and research and arguments
against rent control and pro-tenant demands, as well as to lobby in Washington.  In 1980,
the NRHC changed its name to the National Multi-Housing Council (NMHC), reflecting the
growing number of condominium developers and converters among the  landlords' ranks. 
Although it has been the large apartment owners that have played the most important role,
they have sought to broaden their appeal as defending property rights from government and
tenant interference.  
Unable to roll back rent control at the local level, landlords, led by the NMHC, tried
to defeat rent control by looking to the federal and state governments for help. By l993, 28
states (none of which already had any rent control laws) had passed legislation pre-empting
local governments from enacting rent control. In contrast, housing activists in California,
New York, and Massachusetts had thwarted several referenda, initiatives, and legislative
efforts, bankrolled by apartment owners and real estate groups, to pre-empt local rent
control laws.
When President Reagan was elected in 1980, the real estate industry moved the
battlefield to Washington. His transition team recommended that HUD prohibit the use of
federal housing funds in cities with rent control. In l98l and l982, Senator Alphonse
D'Amato (R-N.Y.) introduced such legislation. D'Amato's own New York City would
have been effected.  After a bruising battle that included intense lobbying by tenant groups
and help from then-Speaker Tip O'Neill (whose home city, Cambridge, Massachusetts, had
a strong tenants movement and a strong rent control program), the D'Amato bill, backed by
the Reagan Administration, went down to defeat. Many Republicans, though opposed to
rent control itself, viewed the measure as unwarranted federal involvement in local affairs.
At the urging of the NMHC, Republicans in Congress continued to file legislation to
punish cities with local rent regulations, including withholding federal housing funds.  Jack
Kemp, President Bush's HUD Secretary, reiterated the call to penalize cities with rent
control.  In May 1988, Sen. William Armstrong (R-Colorado) added a last-minute
amendment to the bill reauthorizing funds for the homeless. Armstrong's measure required
HUD to study how rent control laws might be causing homelessness and gave HUD until
the following October to produce the report.18 Kemp's HUD staff released the much-
anticipated report in September 1991 (two years after the deadline). Much to Kemp's
chagrin, the study concluded that there was no conclusive evidence that rent control causes
homelessness, but urged that "further study should be undertaken."  
In l989, when Congress proposed the first new major housing bill in 15 years, the
National Affordable Housing Act, sponsored by Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Ca.) and Rep.
Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.), tenant activists were dismayed to find that the draft version
included language to withhold federal funds to cities with rent control. Tenant activists were
told that real estate lobbyists had persuaded Cranston, a former builder himself, to
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incorporate the anti-rent control provision. Tenant groups and the National Low-Income
Housing Coalition pushed hard to get the offending language removed, but it was the
intervention of California State Senate President David Roberti, who was close to Cranston,
that made the difference.  The NMHC-sponsored language was watered down. When the
bill was finally passed in 1990, it included an oblique (but still potentially harmful) reference
to rent control: In applying for federal housing funds under the new program, cities and
states were required to explain whether the cost of housing or the incentives to build or
repair housing are "affected by public policies," including "policies that affect the return on
residential investment." No city has been denied funding because it failed to adequately
address that question. 
Rent Control in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts tenants' movement of the late l960s and early 1970s was a
spillover of the student movement, the civil rights movements, and resistance to urban
renewal. Community-based struggles to stop institutional expansion of hospitals and
universities into residential neighborhoods, to stop a proposed federally-funded highway
through residential areas, and to stop the urban renewal bulldozer had created an
organizational infrastructure and a cadre of organizers and activists who took up the cause of
tenants' rights and the empowerment of low-income and working class neighborhoods.19 
Tenant organizations emerged and tactics like rent strikes increased. In Boston as well as in
other nearby cities such as Lynn, Somerville, Cambridge, and Brockton, activists built
tenant organizations in private and FHA-subsidized housing and helped enact rent control in
Boston, Cambridge, Lynn, and Somerville in the early 1970s. Tenant activists formed
"tenant unions" in apartment buildings or among tenants in buildings owned by the same
landlord. They formed neighborhood-based and citywide tenant organizations. They
engaged in various forms of protest, mass rallies, and civil disobedience, including
"eviction blocking." They pushed local government officials to strengthen building code
enforcement. They negotiated with landlords over maintenance and other matters. They
lobbied government officials, registered voters, and campaigned for pro-tenant candidates. 
Once rent control was passed, they provided legal and political support for tenants before
rent control boards and housing courts. 
Since the late 1960s, major political battlegrounds in Boston, Cambridge, and
Brookline have been the regulation of rents, evictions and condo conversions. It has become
the litmus test for identifying political candidates as "conservative" or "liberal."  In all three
cities, rent control ordinances regulated rents (by limiting rent increases to the cost of
increased expenses), evictions (by requiring "good cause" and by requiring hearings before
landlords could go to court), and removals of units from the rental stock (by requiring
permits before units could be demolished or converted to condominiums). The
condominium conversion issue emerged in the late l970s. By the time the three cities enacted
laws to address this issue, and fought the legal battles in court to protect their authority do to
so, a substantial portion of the rental inventory in these cities was lost, undermining some of
the political base for tenants' rights and rent control.
In Massachusetts, cities do not have the authority, on their own, to enact rent
control. Rather, they need to get the permission -- or enabling authority -- from the state
government. In 1970, the state legislature enacted Chapter 842 of the Acts of 1970, enabling
cities and towns with populations over 50,000 to control rents and evictions.20 This law
was the result of several years of political protest and agitation by tenant organizations and
their allies in the state, primarily in the urban areas in the eastern part of the state. Once
Chapter 842 was enacted, tenants quickly pressured city governments in a number of cities -
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- Boston, Cambridge, Brookline, Somerville, and Lynn, in particular -- to enact local rent
regulations.21 In these cities, tenants comprised two-thirds to three-quarters of the residents.
In 1975, Chapter 842 expired and tenant organizations and their allies lobbied the state
legislature to extend it. The real estate industry exercised greater influence, however, and the
legislature only extended the enabling law until March 31, 1976. After that, localities would
have to go through a two-step process to have rent control -- first, they would have to pass a
local law, and second, get it approved (through the vehicle of a home rule petition) by the
entire state legislature. Boston, Cambridge, Brookline, and Somerville did so.22 Lynn ha
repealed its law in 1974. Somerville adopted rent control in 1970, adopted vacancy
decontrol/recontrol in 1976, and completely repealed regulations in 1978, effective the
following March. By l979, only three cities still had rent control: Boston, Cambridge, and
Brookline. Initially, the regulations in these three cities covered all units except government-
subsidized developments, two- and three-unit owner-occupied buildings, and new
construction. 
Cambridge tenant groups initially tried to enact rent control through a citywide
referendum. When that failed, they had more success enacting legislation through the City
Council in 1970, the same route followed by the other cities. Cambridge's law did not allow
for vacancy decontrol. Brookline adopted rent control at a Town Meeting in September
1970. It was amended in 1991 when vacancy decontrol was introduced, permanently
removing units from regulations. In the late l970s both localities adopted additional
protections from condominium conversions. By 1994, Brookline had 4,200 units subject to
control, while in Cambridge about 14,500 to 16,000 units, half the city's rental stock, was
under rent control.23
In Boston, Kevin White was elected mayor in l968 as a pro-rent control candidate.
One of his slogans was: "When landlords raise rents, Kevin White raises hell." Boston
adopted rent control in 1970. Within a few years, however, Mayor White began cultivating
the support of the real estate industry and changed his views. Rent control became a
convenient scapegoat for housing abandonment and high property taxes on homeowners --
problems more accurately linked to the city's overall economic problems, the busing
controversy, and its fiscal crisis. In 1975, Mayor White and the City Council adopted
vacancy decontrol, which permanently removed an apartment from regulation after a tenant
left, as of January 1976.  As a result, once-regulated apartments were gradually exempted
from rent control, declining from over 100,000 units to under 25,000 units by 1983. Only
those tenants who had lived in their apartments since l976 were protected by rent control.24 
During the l980s, the system was amended several times (particularly to deal with
condominium conversions and to add a "rent grievance" system in the decontrolled units),
but the city never reimposed full rent control. 
In the late l970s a huge wave of condominium conversions fueled tenant protest.25
In l979, Ray Flynn (then a City Councilor) proposed a ban on condo conversions, a policy
that had little support among his colleagues. A compromise was reached that provided
tenants with advance notice before they could be evicted for condo conversion, along with
some relocation expenses.  The Massachusetts Tenants Organization was formed in 1981 to
help coordinate and expand these local efforts, primarily around rent increases and
condominium conversions. In that fall's City Council elections, an MTO affiliate, the
Boston Tenants Campaign Organization, composed of neighborhood tenant groups, sent
questionnaires to and interviewed all candidates. BTCO endorsed a "Tenant Ticket,"
distributed flyers in apartment buildings, registered tenant voters, organized a get-out-the-
vote drive, and handed out "Tenant Ticket" poll cards on election day. Two of BTCO's
candidates won, including incumbent Flynn, who -- thanks in part to the tenant vote --
topped the ticket. Two years later, MTO's endorsement and organizing efforts played a key
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role in electing Flynn as Boston's mayor.26 A c nerstone of Flynn's platform was an
overhaul of the tenant protection laws, a return to full rent control, and either a ban on
evictions for condo conversion or a ban on conversion itself. During its ten years in office
(l984-93), the Flynn administration brought tenant and housing activists into government,
adopted stronger tenants' rights laws and provided funds to encourage tenant organizing.27  
In October 1984 the City Council rejected Flynn's plan to restore full rent control. In
its place, the Council substituted a rent grievance system in the decontrolled units,28 banned
condo evictions for low-income and elderly tenants, extended (up to three years) the notice
period for other tenants facing condo conversion, and increased moving expenses (from
$750 to $1000) for tenants displaced by conversion. The compromise measure accurately
reflected the balance of political forces at the time, particularly the Greater Boston Real
Estate Board's (GBREB) influence on the majority of Council members. Flynn continued to
push for stronger tenant protections. In mid-l985 -- with the housing crisis worsening and
condo conversions escalating (even outside the downtown neighborhoods) -- the City
Council gave the rent board the authority to regulate condo conversions by requiring
landlords to obtain a permit before a conversion could take place. The GBREB successfully
challenged the policy in court but the city then got the state legislature to give it the authority
to implement the law. By the mid-1990s, Boston had about 90,000 apartments under the
jurisdiction of the Rent Equity Board, which regulated rents, evictions, and condominium
conversions. Only about 20,000 units were under rent control; the rest were under the
looser rent grievance system. 
The Politics of Deregulation in Massachusetts
Massachusetts landlords organized a campaign for a statewide initiative (Question 9)
to repeal rent control, by pre-empting localities' authority, that appeared on the ballot in
November 1994. It passed with 51% of the vote. The three cities with rent control --
Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline -- voted "no."  Implementation began January 1, 1995.
Landlords had been unhappy about rent control for the 25 years of its existence.
They had succeeded in repealing it in Lynn and Somerville, and watering it down in Boston
and Brookline. Cambridge, like Santa Monica and Berkeley on the West Coast, was viewed
as having an "extreme" or "radical" form of rent control. Cambridge's system would prove
to be the battering ram which landlords used to attack rent control at the state level. 
Tenant organizing in Cambridge had atrophied by the mid-1980s.29 A core of tenant
activists continued to appear at City Council meetings and to advocate before the rent control
board. This same core managed to regroup the fragile coalition of tenants, senior citizens
and other constituencies at each election cycle. But the energy and organizational capacity of
the tenant constituency had severely dwindled. This vacuum was filled by a new
organization, the Small Property Owners Association (SPOA). SPOA was composed of
homeowners and small landlords, but it quickly hitched its political wagon to more powerful
real estate industry forces under the banner of the Massachusetts Homeowners Coalition
(MHC). SPOA served, in effect, as the public face of the anti-rent control effort, while the
money and strategies were controlled by the real estate industry trade associations and their
hired campaign consultants.
SPOA's goal was the complete elimination of rent control. To the extent that its
membership was composed of relatively small property owners -- homeowners and small-
scale apartment owners -- they linked their personal and their property interests much more
intimately than large developers and landlords. According to Cantor, they believed that "rent
control violated their fundamental personal rights."30 
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Moreover, SPOA engaged in somewhat militant tactics, more akin to groups like
ACT-UP (gay rights) or Operation Rescue (anti-abortion) than to traditional real estate
industry approaches. For example, they picketed and spoke out fervently at Cambridge City
Council meetings. They projected an imagine of small property owners being abused by
unresponsive government, the "People's Republic of Cambridge."31  They told "horror
stories" of condo owners who were forbidden by the rent control law (or board decisions)
from living in their own units, or being unable to convert room housings into single family
homes where they wanted to live, of being unable to evict tenants who failed to pay rent,
and of long delays in getting rent increases.  MHC members held up signs at university
graduations. They wrote letters to the editors of local papers. They frequently appeared on
radio talk shows and found reporters and columnists who wrote sympathetic stories about
their "plight."32 (Importantly, the radio shows and daily newspapers that covered
Cambridge were part of the larger Boston media market, so this anti-rent control message
extended beyond Cambridge). They argued that rent control forces landlords to subsidize
tenants. "Providing affordable housing should be society's problem," MHC president
Denise Jillson told the Boston Globe, "not the problem of the individual property owners."
They compared the struggle of small property owners to overturn the "tyranny" of local rent
control to the civil rights movement's efforts to get the federal government to overturn local
segregation laws.33 
SPOA was not only well-organized, but also politically savvy. It made a point of
showcasing only "small" property owners, even though much of their financial support
came from large real estate interests. It focused attention on minority, immigrant, and senior
citizen members. It highlighted examples of affluent tenants paying below-market rents in
buildings owned by purportedly financially-strapped landlords.34 This reinforced the image
they sought to project -- that rent control did not primarily help the poor. SPOA succeeded
in persuading the Cambridge City Council to commission a study by a private consulting
firm of who lived in rent controlled housing.35 
SPOA lost its first major political battle during the 1989 local elections. Three long-
time rent control supporters on the City Council declined to run for re-election, making the
City Council races a referendum on rent control. Also, landlords (primarily large property
owners concerned about local restrictions on condo conversion) collected enough signatures
to get "Proposition 1-2-3" on the local ballot and financed an expensive and sophisticated
campaign to reach voters. It would have allowed landlords to convert apartments to condos
if the tenants wanted to buy them, undermining the city's law which linked condo
conversion to housing market indicators. If successful, Proposition 1-2-3 would have
eliminated rental units and undermined the political base of support for rent control.
However on election day, voters defeated the proposition by a two-to-one margin and
elected an unprecedented 6-3 pro-rent control majority on the City Council.
Although angered by this defeat, SPOA viewed the l989 elections as one battle in a
longer war. Equally important, although real estate forces lost the local elections, they had
helped set in motion a changing political climate by chipping away at the image of rent
control as a policy that protected the most vulnerable people. They had begun to set the stage
for a full-scale attack on rent control several years later. Over the next few years, SPOA
spearheaded a constant media attack on rent control.36 It did a good job of identifying a few
high-profile "undeserving tenants" -- primarily professionals with good incomes, including
Cambridge's mayor and a state court judge -- who were used as the symbols of rent
control's inequities.37   
During the summer of 1993, SPOA began preparing for a statewide initiative
campaign to ban rent control. A majority of residents in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline
were renters. Statewide, however, owner-occupied units outnumbered rental units by 1.35
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million to 980,000.38 Moreover, homeowners had higher levels of voter registration and
turnout than tenants. Amidst much controversy, the state Attorney General in September
1993 ruled that the measure could appropriately be put before the state's voters, even though
it only applied to a few localities. The Greater Boston Real Estate Board and its Rental
Housing Association, which represented the big landlords, developers, and management
firms, did not agree with this strategy. Its leaders were "frightened" of putting the issue
before the voters. "What if the reverse happened and we lost?" They felt on safer ground
working through city councils and the state legislature, where they had skilled lobbyists and
political clout.39 But the GBREB recognized that the SPOA was going to move forward
anyway, so it soon joined forces with the small property owners to push Question 9.
Soon after the Attorney General approved the ballot measure, Ed Shanahan, director
of GBREB's Rental Housing Association, "got a frantic phone call from Denise Jillson,"
the head of SPOA, asking for RHA's help. "We put together a coalition called the
Massachusetts Homeowners Coalition (MHC)," Shanahan explained. The steering
committee included Jillson (representing SPOA), Shanahan, Ed Zuker (a major Boston area
landlord), Doug Thayer (a Cambridge landlord), and a representative of the Massachusetts
Realtors Association. It was this group that spearheaded the Question 9 effort, although they
sought to identify the public face of the campaign with small property owners like Jillson
who was, "the perfect poster girl" for their cause.40 The campaign for and against Question
9 began in the summer of 1994 until election day, November 8. Using local realtors and
paid canvassers, MHC began soliciting signatures to place the measure on the ballot in
November 1994.41 
SPOA helped to chip away at support for rent control among people not directly
affected by the policy -- third parties such as the media, homeowners, and others.42 Media
accounts about rent control were generally unsympathetic.43  One Bos on Globe r porter,
writing about his experience selling his condominium, wrote about his "nightmare" dealing
with the Cambridge Rent Control board.44 Three out of four Globe columnists supported
Question 9; two of the opponents wrote several columns on the topic during the campaign,
repeating SPOA's views about rent control "horror stories." Columnist David Nyhan called
rent control a "yuppie subsidy, a middle-class loophole hurting small-time property
owners." Columnist Jeff Jacoby claimed that "like socialists the world over, the rent radicals
of Boston, Brookline and Cambridge operate on the principle that whatever they win is
permanent and whenever they lose it's negotiable." Columnist Bella English claimed the big
losers if rent control was abolished would be the "politicians, professors, judges, doctors,
lawyers, Harvard students and businessmen, who have enjoyed cheap digs for years."45
The reporters, columnists and editorial writers at the Boston H rald, the region's other
major daily paper, consistently supported Question 9.
The Massachusetts Tenants Organization led the charge against Question 9. It
formed an umbrella organization, Save Our Communities Coalition (SOCC), composed
primarily of tenant activists in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline, the three communities
that would be directly affected. SOCC focused its measure on the harmful impact Question 9
would have on the elderly. It showcased elderly renters who would be hurt if rents were
deregulated.46 In posters and bumper stickers, it advertised its slogan: "Bad for Elderly --
Bad for You."  SOCC's rallies and protests, all in the Boston area, received minimal media
attention. For example, no reporters showed up at a SOCC-sponsored October 12 rally on
the steps of the State House. Various unions, the AARP, Boston Mayor Tom Menino, and a
variety of community organizations and public interest groups endorsed the "No on 9"
campaign. In contrast to much of its reporting and several of its columnists, the Boston
Globe editorialized against Question 9 on the grounds that it interfered with the "home rule"
authority of localities.47 Indeed, throughout the Question 9 campaign and the subsequent
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legislative fight, rent control proponents emphasized the home rule principal as much, or
even more, than the benefits of rent control.48
Rent control's supporters were clearly on the defensive. Even the director of the
Massachusetts Tenants Organization acknowledged to the Boston Globe that "it's not a
perfect system," arguing that only a handful of tenants in rent-controlled apartments are
rich.49 
The SOCC-led effort was completely outmaneuvered by the pro-Question 9
campaign. This was a classic example of the impact of money on elections.  The campaign
used rent control as an example of the undue influence of big government. Its logo showed
a house with the words "Get Gov't Out" across it. Its TV and radio ads focused on rent
control's "unfairness," primarily using examples from Cambridge, which had the strongest
law among the three cities and which, despite its large low-income and minority population,
was known outside the Boston area primarily as the home of Harvard, MIT, and its
student/intellectual culture. The real estate forces hired several consultants to conduct studies
which, not surprisingly, alleged to show that rent control in Cambridge disproportionately
helped the non-poor.50 
During the campaign, the media reported tenants' fears of huge rent increases as well
as landlords' promises that rent increases would be fair and reasonable. The Globe quot d
one large property management company official's prediction that it would not make "an
immediate hike that would force people out." Another landlord said that "It should take a
year to find out the market, and at that point we'll negotiate a new rent. In most cases, even
if the rent should be $1,200, we'll agree to less to have a tenant stay rather than have a
vacancy."51
The pro-Question 9 forces outspent their opponents by at least a seven-to-one ratio --
$1.06 million vs. $158,248. The proponents used this financial advantage to hire
professional consultants to manage the campaign, to do polling, and to buy TV and radio
advertisements. Proponents spent over $200,000 on paid TV ads. The "Yes" campaign
received most of its money in $500-or-more contributions, many of them from out-of-state.
Nineteen real estate firms contributed $510,022, more than half (53.9%) of the "Yes"
campaign's funds. The list of contributors reads like a "who's who" of the Boston area's
major realtors, landlords, developers, and property management firms. The Greater Boston
Real Estate Board alone contributed $168,878 to the "Yes" campaign, $118,878 in gifts and
in-kind services plus a loan of $50,000. The next biggest source of funds for the "Yes"
campaign came from the National Association of Realtors and the Institute of Real Estate
Management, based in Chicago. They funneled their combined $75,000 contribution to
BMC Strategies, a political consulting firm, to be used for TV ads. The "No" forces had one
paid staff person. They had no money for TV ads. Only 11% of the $158,249 it raised came
from $500+ contributions.52
A Globe poll a week before the election found 34% of likely voters supported
Question 9, 37% opposed it, and 29% were undecided.53 The Question 9 campaign's
financial resources helped sway enough undecided voters to bring victory. Question 9 won
by a narrow margin: $51.3% (1,034,594) to $48.7% (980,723).54 An analysis of the vote
reveals that voters in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline -- where Question 9 would have
direct impact -- voted substantially against the measure, although not by margins large
enough to make a difference in the statewide outcome. In most cities and towns outside the
Boston metropolitan area -- for example, in Springfield, Fall River, New Bedford,
Lawrence, Holyoke, Fitchburg, on Cape Cod and in the Berkshires -- a majority of voters
voted "no." Question 9's small margin of victory came from the Boston area suburbs,
where the real estate industry's campaign concentrated its media efforts. One cannot also
discount the sentiment toward rent control that had accumulated over the previous few years
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aided by articles in the Boston area media market. The Question 9 campaign simply
reinforced these views.
After the November elections, tenant activists in Boston, Brookline, and Cambridge
pushed their city governments to file home rule petitions in the state legislature to reinstate a
version of rent control.55 These local battles in each city were highly contentious, involving
controversial public hearings and protests.56 Th  Cambridge version called for phasing out
rent control over five years. The Boston and Brookline versions called for weaker versions
of their vacancy decontrol systems. They had to get a bill through the lame-duck legislature
before the session ended on January 3, 1995, since Question 9 would go into effect on
January 1 and many landlords had announced that they were planning substantial rent hikes.
The tenants and sympathetic local public officials knew, however, that whatever bill they
could get through the two houses, both with a majority of Democrats, would be vetoed by
Republican Governor William Weld, a Cambridge resident who had just won an
overwhelming re-election victory and was strongly opposed to rent control. They didn't
have sufficient support to override Weld's veto. SPOA lobbied the legislators to reject any
home rule petition that continued any form of rent control. Weld announced that he would
only approve a petition that SPOA could live with. "If they are satisfied, I am satisfied,"
Weld said disingenuously, "I am almost a spectator here."57 
At this point, the years-long drumbeat of criticism about rent control bore fruit. Even
rent control advocates realized that their only hope for protecting any form of regulation
would require some kind of means-test. Mayor Menino pushed a home rule petition through
the Boston City Council that would protect elderly, disabled and low- and moderate-income
renters.58 But after lobbying legislators and Gov. Weld, Menino realized he'd have to water
down the city's proposal.59 Real estate interests were able to win the argument, among
legislators and the media, that even elderly and disabled tenants should be subject to a means
test. Rep. Thomas Finneran, a Democratic from Boston and chairman of the powerful Ways
and Means Committee, argued in favor of the "narrowest version possible," including
vacancy decontrol, and a means test limited to the elderly and disabled.60 Weighing in on
the subject, the Globe encouraged the legislature and Governor to approve home rule
petitions that incorporate vacancy decontrol and a means test protecting only low-income
renters, which it labeled a "decent compromise" and a "sensible compromise."61 
In late November and early December, the House approved the three home rule
petitions, but lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to override Weld's veto, while the
Senate approved Cambridge's plan (ironically, the weakest of the three), amended Boston's
(requiring it to be phased out in five years), and rejected Brookline's.62 In late D cember,
the House and Senate approved a weaker version that extended rent control for two years,
but only for elderly, disabled, and low-income renters.63 According to several sources,
many Democratic legislators cast their vote in favor of the home rule petitions knowing that
they lacked the votes to override a veto -- a safe way to tell voters they supported rent
control without alienating the real estate industry. 
The legislature defeated last-minute attempts by pro-rent control legislators to amend
the law to include provide blanket protection for all disabled and elderly tenants (regardless
of income), and to include a local option provision, which would allow Boston, Cambridge,
and Brookline to revert to their existing rent control systems.64
Weld said he would veto the bill unless it was changed to incorporate amendments
drafted by the Massachusetts Association of Realtors, which would extend rent control for
two years, but only for low-income renters already living in rent controlled apartments.
Even elderly and handicapped renters should be subject to a low-income means test.65 On
January 3, Weld announced that he and the real estate industry had reached an agreement.
With two minutes left in the session, on a voice vote, the legislature passed the bill on
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January 3, 1995; Weld signed it the next day.66
The new law, as one legislator put it, allowed rent control to "die with dignity."67
The law immediately decontrolled all units which were not occupied by a tenant who met the
new income eligibility guidelines. Eligible tenants were defined as those with incomes of
60% or less than the median income for the Boston SMSA (at that time, $21,500 for a
single person). An exception was granted for elderly tenants (62 years or more) and
disabled tenants; for them, the eligibility limit was set at 80% of median income ($27,950).
The incomes of all residents of a unit (household income) was to be counted. Full-time
students were not to be considered eligible for protection. Rent control for income-eligible
tenants in buildings with up to 12 units would end on December 31, 1995, while those in
larger buildings would no longer be protected at December 31, 1996. The law specified that
for income-eligible tenants, landlords could raise rents in these rent controlled units by 5% a
year, or up to 30% of the tenants income. Local rent control boards lost the authority to
regulate evictions.68 
Interestingly, media coverage of the rent control issue expanded dramatically after
Question 9 has passed. Most of the reporting focused on the personalities and maneuverings
engaged in the home rule legislative battle, on the political maneuverings of Governor Weld,
legislative leaders, and Boston Mayor Tom Menino over whether the legislature and
Governor would approve local home rule petitions and, in effect, override the Question 9
vote. Yet at no time during the legislative phase of this issue did the media analyze the
influence of the real estate lobby, including its campaign contributions, in the legislature. It
covered the home rule debate as a matter of ideology and political in-fighting. Immediately
after the Question 9 vote, a few stories focused on the fears of tenants worried about
dramatic rent increases and the delight of landlords freed from regulatory abuse.69 These
articles increased in 1995 and 1996 when the new law took effect, particularly as the phase-
in period was coming to an end. 
Several news accounts noted that the small property owners, led by the SPOA, were
angered by the compromise that allowed the two-year phase-out of rent control. As the
inside game within the legislature played itself out, Gov. Weld and the legislatures
negotiated with the Greater Boston Real Estate Board and the Massachusetts Association of
Realtors, and shut the SPOA out of the negotiations.70 They felt "sold out" by the big
landlords.71 SPOA had laid the groundwork, served as the media spokespersons, and
framed the ideological debate, but were viewed as too uncompromising when it came time
for the endgame. In doing so, they helped the major real estate lobby groups appear to be
moderates rather than the "heavies." The political center of gravity had shifted so far in the
industry's favor that the bill to entirely phase-out 25 years of rent control was called a
"compromise."
Rent Control in California
In the 1970s, California seemed an unlikely place for a broad movement for tenants'
rights. As Heskin notes, "Aspiring tenant organizers considered the California tenant to be
too individualistic and too mobile to be organized" and "the densities of renters too low for
mass collective action."72 But a California tenants movement exploded in l978 following
passage of Proposition 13, the tax-cutting amendment. California had an upsurge of tenant
activism in the late l970s and early 1980s, and then -- with a few local exceptions --
experienced a lapse starting in the mid-l980s which continued into the 1990s.  
During much of the l960s, apartment vacancy rates in the state's urban areas were
high; some landlords even complained of an "apartment glut."73 This began to change in the
l970s, as rental apartment construction fell, vacancy rates fell, and rents increased faster
16
than inflation. Moreover, skyrocketing housing prices shut out many middle-class
households from homebuying. Except in Berkeley, however, there was little tenant activism
in response to these changing market forces. In 1972, Berkeley voters passed a rent control
charter amendment through the initiative process. The city began to implement the law, but
landlords successfully challenged the amendment in court. In Birkenfeld v. Berkeley, the
Alameda County Superior Court (in 1973) and the state Court of Appeal (in June 1995) held
that the Berkeley law was unconstitutional on procedural grounds, but it found that cities
had the right to adopt rent control without further state legislation. 
In 1975, Senator David Roberti filed a rent control bill that died "quickly and
quietly" in the Senate Judiciary Committee, a reflection of the weak political constituency at
the time.74 In the mid-1970s, even before the upsurge of tenant activism, California's real
estate industry recognized the potential for a wave of tenant protest and demands for rent
regulations, especially in light of Birkenfeld v Berkeley. In 1976, the California Housing
Council, a new coalition of the state's major apartment developers, owners, and managers,
along with their allies among realtors and smaller landlords, pushed a bill (AB 3788)
through both houses of the state legislature pre-empting localities from adopting rent
control. A fledgling California Renters Coalition was too weak to effectively oppose the bill
in the legislature or the media. But on the advice of his liberal housing department director,
Arnold Sternberg, and with the support of his liberal constituency, particularly Jack
Henning, the head of the state AFL-CIO, Gov. Jerry Brown vetoed the bill, angering the
real estate community.75 
Sensing that a battle was brewing, a handful of tenant organizers and legal aid
attorneys recognized that they needed to be better organized and in l977 250 activists met in
Los Angeles to form the California Housing and Information Network (CHAIN) to serve as
the umbrella coalition for tenants' rights.76 A few local groups, such as the Coalition for
Economic Survival (CES) in Los Angeles, began to organize tenants around rent increases,
evictions, and maintenance issues. In 1977, CES and the Gray Panthers, a radical senior
citizens group, began pushing the Los Angeles City Council to adopt rent control, initially
promoting ordinances against "rent gouging." Simultaneously, tenants in Santa Monica
launched an effort to place a rent control initiative on the June 1978 ballot. These groups
were able to mobilize hundreds of tenants for public hearings and rallies. Smaller efforts
were underway in Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, Long Beach, and San Diego, while tenants
continued to push for rent control in Berkeley.
Gov. Brown's veto of the CHC's pre-emption bill proved fateful, because demand
for rent control exploded across the state in the aftermath of Proposition 13. Proposition 13
was spearheaded by ultra-conservative political forces. The leader of the tax revolt was
Howard Jarvis, chief executive of the Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, who
sent a mailing to landlords urging them to "convince your tenants that lower property taxes
mean lower rents."77 A month before election day, the California Apartment Association
announced that landlords would pass property tax savings onto tenants if Proposition 13
passed. Recognizing the dangers of a tenant backlash if landlords failed to fulfill their
promises, the CHC opposed Proposition 13.
On the same day that Proposition 13 won by a two-to-one margin statewide, rent
control initiatives were defeated in Santa Monica (56-44%) and Santa Barbara (by roughly
the same margin), even though tenants represented a majority in both communities. Real
estate interests poured huge sums of money to defeat these referenda.78 An analysis of
voting results revealed that precincts that favored Proposition 13 voted against rent control,
often by a similar margin. Throughout the state, in fact, voters who opposed rent control
thought that property taxes were the cause of high rents. They expected Proposition 13 to
hold down rents.  
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The California Housing Council was the only major real estate industry group to
oppose Proposition 13.79  After Prop 13 passed, the CHC sent a letter to its members
across the state urging them to reduce rents.80 But the anticipated windfall of rent rollbacks
did not materialize. In fact, many of California's 3.5 million tenants received notices of rent
increases shortly after Proposition 13 passed. This set the stage for a significant tenant
backlash. Throughout the state, tenants who had been hit by rent increases organized
meetings to demand that landlords share their property tax savings. Newspapers were filled
with stories of outraged renters, embarrassed landlords, and politicians jumping onto the
bandwagon. For example, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, who had earlier lent his name
to the anti-rent control campaign in nearby Santa Monica, called for a citywide rent freeze
ordinance. As public clamor mounted, some landlords agreed to voluntarily reduce rents in
order to avoid mandatory rollbacks and freezes. 
Tenant pressure did not subside. Governor Brown established a renter "hotline"
which, at one point, was receiving 12,000 phone calls a day to register complaints about
rent hikes.81 When heavy real estate industry lobbying defeated a statewide bill requiring
landlords to pass on Proposition 13 savings to tenants, the battle shifted to the local level.
Groups like CES, the Gray Panthers, CHAIN, and Tom Hayden's statewide Campaign for
Economic Democracy (which grew out of his unsuccessful bid for U.S. Senate in 1976)
organized tenants and kept the anger about post-Prop 13 rent hikes in the news.  Tenant
groups began to mobilize in communities across the state, demanding rent control.
Experienced tenant leaders began to travel across the state, helping local groups.
Newspapers reported an upsurge of rent strikes, even in the politically moderate San
Fernando Valley section of Los Angeles.82
By 1981, more than 25 California communities, including Los Angeles and San
Francisco, had passed some kind of rent control laws. By 1988, 78 communities in
California had some form of rent control, although in 64 of these jurisdictions rent control
was limited to mobile homes. In the 14 cities where rent regulations covered apartments,
nearly one million units were covered.83 Eleven of those 14 laws were enacted by
ordinance. In Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Cotati, they were put into place by voters
through the initiative process. In nine of these jurisdictions, the rent regulations not only
covered rents, but included "just cause" eviction, limiting landlords' ability to evict a tenant
without due process and cause. Los Angeles, Palm Springs and Thousand Oaks exempted
so-called "luxury units" from rent regulations. Several cities exempted single-family homes;
some exempted condominiums. Twelve of the 14 jurisdictions (except Los Gatos and
Cotati) exempted new construction from rent regulations. Nine of the jurisdictions provide
for vacancy decontrol, allowing landlords to set rents at market levels when a tenant
voluntarily vacates an apartment; in six of these jurisdictions, the law requires that the unit
be placed back under rent regulation after the new tenant moves in and the landlord has set
the market rent. Berkeley, Santa Monica, West Hollywood, East Palo Alto, Cotati, and
Palm Springs did not allow vacancy decontrol. Local rent boards set rent levels each year,
no matter how many times the units turn over. Jurisdictions vary in the formulas they use to
set rent increases.84 
In response to tenant pressure, rent strikes, and steady news coverage about rent
increases and angry tenants, especially seniors, the Los Angeles City Council passed a six-
month rent freeze in August 1978.85 As the rent freeze was reaching its end, tenant forces
and their allies pushed for a permanent and strict rent regulation law. The City Council
adopted a somewhat watered-down version of regulation, including vacancy decontrol and
an exemption for single-family homes, which went into effect May 1, 1979. This law was
reviewed annually by the City Council, with minor changes. In 1981 the City Council made
significant changes. The original law permitted a 7.6% rent increase annually. After 1981,
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this was reduced to a 5.6% annual rent increase. From the beginning, landlords were
allowed to raise rents more freely when an apartment became vacant, but then adjusted
further rent increases for the new tenant. The original law allowed new rents to be set to
market levels. The new law limited rent increases to 10%. Both laws exempted new
construction, hotels, single family dwellings and so-called "luxury units" (those with rents
above a specific level. Both laws contained "sunset" provisions which would end rent
control if the vacancy rate in Los Angeles rental housing rose above 5%.86 
The Los Angeles law did not apply to the unincorporated areas of Los Angeles
County, including West Hollywood, where renters composed 80% of the population.
Renters organized rent strikes and rallies with as many as a thousand demonstrators and
successfully pressured the county Board of Supervisors to pass a rent control law that
applied to unincorporated areas. The law included a "sunset" provision and in 1985 the
Board of Supervisors did not extend it. Fear of this threat led activists in West Hollywood
to seek to incorporate a new city. Soon after West Hollywood became a separate city, the
city council adopted rent control in June 1985. Rent control was also the driving force
behind the efforts to incorporate a new city in East Palo Alto.87 E st Pal  Alto, which had
about 3,000 rental units and a large African-American community, was incorporated in
1983.88 It adopted rent control a few months later. Landlords were unsuccessful at
repealing it with several city ballot measures, sponsored by the California Apartment
Owners Association.89
Rent control was the centerpiece of electoral activity in Berkeley and Santa Monica,
where progressive coalitions won majority blocs on the City Council of each city. In the late
l960s, Berkeley was a hotbed of "radical" political activity, not only on the campus but also
in the community. The Berkeley Tenants Union was formed in 1969. It formed part of a
coalition of progressive activists who mobilized to gain a foothold in city government with
rent control one of their key platforms. After the courts reversed the 1972 pro-rent control
ballot measure on procedural grounds, the coalition tried again. Rent control supporters put
another initiative on the April 1977 ballot. It lost 63% to 37%. Following Proposition 13,
Berkeley voters approved a temporary rent freeze on the November 1978 ballot by 58% to
42%. Voters adopted permanent full rent control in a June 1980 initiative. The pro-tenant
governing regime remained in power for almost two decades until the pro-tenant majority on
the rent control board was defeated by voters in 1993.90 A court decision over the meaning
of a "fair return" forced Berkeley to water-down its rent regulations in 1992, resulting in
major rent increases.91 The Berkeley law regulated 21,000 of the 24,500 rental units in the
City.92 
In Santa Monica, a coastal city of 90,000 adjacent to Los Angeles, the tenants
movement formed the core of an ongoing governing coalition.93  As no ed above, voters
had defeated a rent control ballot measure in June 1978 by a 55.5% to 45.5% margin, even
though renters comprised 80% of the city's residents.. In the wake of Prop 13, activists
regrouped. They formed a political coalition, Santa Monicans for Renters' Rights (SMRR),
which drew on a wide group of senior citizen, consumer, Democratic Party, and housing
activists. SMRR put another rent control measure, Proposition A, on the ballot in April
1979.94 Although SMRR was outspent $217,257 to $38,443, it effectively mobilized
renters as campaign volunteers. Proposition A won by a 54.5% to 45.5%.95  A few months
later, a pro-tenant slate, organized by SMRR was elected to the rent control board. The next
November, SMRR forces defeated Proposition Q, a real estate industry-sponsored ballot
measure to weaken the rent control law by adopting vacancy decontrol. In 1981, SMRR's
slate won a majority of seats on the City Council and elected a SMRR leader as mayor. The
campaign mobilized over 6,000 people to get involved in phone calling, door-to-door
canvassing, and other electoral activities. Since l981, SMRR has held a voting majority on
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the City Council, with the exception of l984 through 1988.  All of SMRR's candidates
supported rent control and tenants' rights, but they have included union leaders, a minister,
a high school teacher, a cab driver, a disabled activist, a lesbian activist and others.
As a governing coalition, SMRR strengthened Santa Monica's rent control and
condo conversion law -- key issues in an attractive beach city that was undergoing extremely
strong development pressures. Indeed, Santa Monica's rent control law was perhaps the
strongest in the country; for example, it did not automatically allow landlords to increase
rents when they refinanced their properties. SMRR also elected a majority to the rent control
board, guaranteeing that the law would be implemented effectively. Once in office, SMRR
enacted a broad progressive agenda that went beyond tenant problems.96 But a dent in the
SMRR coalition involved a controversy over the city's tolerance of homeless people in
public places.  Even in "the People's Republic of Santa Monica," as opponents called the
city, political support for rent control was weakened in the early l990s by two forces: a
visible increase in homelessness, which landlords effectively linked to the city's rent control
law, and the Northridge earthquake of January 1994. Complaints from businesses and other
citizens led SMRR to toughen its policy by allowing police to remove homeless vagrants
from public places and require them to move to a city-run shelter or day program. 
Other cities joined the rent control list. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors
passed rent control (with vacancy decontrol) in 1979 to head off a stronger initiative put on
the ballot by community and tenant groups.  San Jose's law went into effect in l979. It was
called the Rental Dispute Mediation and Arbitration ordinance.97  
Faced with all these local brushfire battles, and unable to get Gov. Brown to sign a
local pre-emption bill, the real estate industry's strategy was to circumvent the liberal
governor by putting the issue of pre-emption before the voters in a statewide initiative.98
Seeking to stop the rent control momentum, the CHC, the umbrella lobby group of the
state's largest landlords, spearheaded the campaign for Proposition 10, which appeared on
the ballot on June 3, 1980. Voters overwhelmingly defeated Proposition 10 by a 65% to
35% margin, despite the fact that the CHC outspent the opposition by an 80-to-1 margin.99
The landlord campaign used the usual arguments that rent control stymied new construction
as well as maintenance and thus have a serious negative impact on the supply of rental
housing. CHC polls showed that, as a group, "landlords" were not well-liked.100  (At the
same time, San Diego Mayor Pete Wilson successfully led the opposition to a rent control
initiative in that city).101
During the l980s, the statewide momentum for rent control slowed down.  No new
cities enacted rent control laws, but neither did local politicians seek to weaken rent control
where it already existed. The real estate industry recognized in 1987 that "rent control may
no longer be the single hot issue that it once was." While it was difficult to roll back existing
local laws, the industry saw that "rent control no longer draws the overriding community
concern that it once did."102 In 1987, for example, only one locality, Burlingame, sought to
pass a rent control measure, and it was defeated.103  In 1988, the CHC helped defeat a
citywide ballot initiative for full rent control. In 1991, Mayor Art Agnos, who had been
elected as a rent control supporter, got the Board of Supervisors to pass full rent control, but
the real estate industry got the issue on the ballot and orchestrated an expensive and
successful campaign to repeal the Board's vote.104 Then in December 1991 the real estate
industry helped police chief Frank Jordan, a foe of rent control, defeat Agnos for re-
election. The ballot victory and Jordan's election, in a liberal city with a big tenant majority,
led real estate interests to conclude that "rent control is not what it used to be" as a political
issue.105 
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The Politics of Deregulation in California
Beginning in 1983, Assemblyman Jim Costa (D-Fresno) annually introduced a bill
on behalf of real estate industry (California Housing Council, California Association of
Realtors, California Apartment Association, and California Building Industry Association)
to weaken local rent regulation, or what they termed "radical rent control ordinances."106
The Costa bills included a requirement for vacancy decontrol, an exemption for new
construction, and an exemption for single-family homes. In 1983 and 1984, his bills
included mobile homes, but subsequent bills exempted mobile homes. 
Typically, the Costa bill would whiz thru the Assembly, whose leaders were closely
connected to real estate lobbyists, but bog down in the Senate, largely at the behest of
Senator David Roberti. Roberti was majority leader and then president pro tem of the
Senate. He represented part of Los Angeles's San Fernando Valley, as well as parts of
Hollywood, and was a major fundraiser for his Democratic colleagues.107 Roberti would
assign the Costa bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which had a strong liberal majority.
Invariably, the committee would reject the Costa bill.108
In fact, only Roberti's influence kept the state legislature from bowing to landlord
pressure to dismantle local rent laws. The real estate industry, especially the California
Housing Council, identified Roberti as their chief obstacle to eliminating rent control. "As
long as Roberti was there, we couldn't win. So we focused our attention on the local level,
just trying to keep the lid on," explained the CHC's lobbyist.109By the early 1980s, tenant
organizing in California had declined significantly. Only in Santa Monica, and to a lesser
degree in West Hollywood, East Palo Alto, and Berkeley, did tenant organizations wield
significant political influence. Roberti consistently warned tenant activists and cities with
rent control not to get complacent, and encouraged them to organize, since he would not be
in the legislature forever, but they did not heed his warnings. In the big cities like San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Jose, tenant organizing was ineffective. But, according to
CHC lobbyist Steve Carlson, "the rent control forces never had to assert themselves so long
as Roberti was there. It was a slam dunk."110 
Over the years, apartment owners and other real estate interests invested millions in
campaign contributions to support anti-rent control legislation. A 1987 report by the
California Association of Realtors claimed that the industry had spent over $14.2 million to
fight rent control. About $5.6 million was spent on Proposition 10 in 1980. A more recent
estimate claimed that in the past 12 years, the industry spent an estimated $50 million to
fight rent control -- pouring money into local rent control ballot initiatives, city council,
legislative, and gubernatorial races, and efforts to unseat Roberti. A real estate lobbyist
explained, "it is a small investment when you consider a billion dollars or more in apartment
real estate values are at stake."111
In some ways, rent control's fate was doomed in 1988, when California voters
passed an initiative imposing term limits on state legislators. That meant that Roberti would
have to leave the state Senate in l995. In 1994, the real estate industry and the National Rifle
Association (angered by Roberti's support for strong gun control) tried to evict Roberti from
the legislature a year early by sponsoring a recall campaign in his new Senate district. The
recall effort by NRA failed with Roberti garnering help from housing activists from Santa
Monica and other cities outside his new district.112  Tenant activists from as far away as San
Francisco came to the San Fernando Valley to campaign against the recall vote.113 
After the recall effort failed, but knowing that Roberti would be out of office after
1995, the real estate industry set the stage for the following year's battle. Again, Costa filed
his legislation. Again, it sailed through the Assembly and wound up in the Senate Judiciary
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Committee. A public hearing was held in June 1994. This time, however, the vote was
closer than in earlier years. A number of Democrats who in the past had voted with Roberti
broke ranks and others had to have their arms twisted by Roberti and labor leaders. A
hearing was held in Sacramento in June.114 But they came within one vote of passing the
bill in the Judiciary Committee. The deciding vote was cast by Sen. Art Torres, a liberal
Democratic, who was also leaving office.115 Tellingly, Sen. Bill Lockyer, who would
replace Roberti as president pro tem, abstained. In June 1994 the state Senate voted against
the bill.116 According to CHC lobbyist Steve Carlson, "It seemed to us that we were getting
closer." As president pro tem, "Lockyer wouldn't make this a life-or-death issue that way
Roberti did."117  Defeated, Costa withdrew his bill on August 16, 1994, but it was already
clear that Roberti's grip had weakened and that the real estate industry was flexing its
muscles for the next legislative session.
Several factors changed the balance of forces.118 Rob rti was forced to leave the
Senate because of term limits; his final term ended in December 1995. Senator Bill Lockyer,
no ardent fan of rent control, was elected president pro tem. Also, Costa was elected to the
Senate. In 1995, the Republicans won control of the Assembly. The political center of
gravity had shifted to the right.119  Governor Pete Wilson was re-elected in November
1994, defeating Kathleen Brown. A long-time opponent of rent control, going back to his
tenure as San Diego mayor, he was certain to sign any anti-rent control bill.120
In 1995, the San Jose Mercury-News de cribed the Costa bill as "moving smoothly"
through the legislature.121 Costa bill was approved by a 5-2 vote in Senate Judiciary
Committee on April 4, 1995.122 Senator Nicholas Petris, a liberal Democrat who
represented Oakland and Berkeley and was a member of the Judiciary Committee, as well as
a long-time supporter of rent control, voted for the Costa bill in the Judiciary Committee,
sending it to the Senate floor.123  The Senate passed the Costa bill on May 23, 1995 by 22
to 14 vote, one more than the majority required.124 Ironically, Petris voted against it once it
reached the floor.125  The Assembly Housing and Community Development Committee
approved the bill 6-2 on June 21, 1995.126 The bill was approved 10-7 by the Assembly
Appropriations Committee in July, 1995.127 On July 24, 1995, the Senate (24-11) and
Assembly (45-18) passed the Costa/Hawkins bill.128 To win Assembly passage, Democrats
supported compromise provisions that phased in rent increases over 3 years, then allows
full decontrol. Rents can go up 15% the first year.129 Wilson signed the bill on August 4,
1995, with the law to go into effect on January 1, 1996.130
Opposition to the Costa/Hawkins bill was very feeble. Only Santa Monica, West
Hollywood, Berkeley, East Palo Alto, and Cotati would be significantly affected, because
the other cities with rent regulations already had vacancy decontrol. San Francisco and Los
Angeles would lose their rent regulations on single-family homes, but this did not provide a
broad enough political constituency to mobilize serious opposition. Tenant groups from
these jurisdictions and city governments sent representatives to the public hearings in
Sacramento, but were vastly outnumbered by representatives from the real estate industry,
particularly so-called "Mom and Pop" landlords who were the public face of the industry
campaign. The Western Center on Law and Poverty, an arm of legal services, led the
opposition. It sought to piece together a coalition of local tenant groups, senior citizens
groups, religious groups, and local governments. The cities of Santa Monica, Berkeley, and
West Hollywood chipped in funds to hire a Sacramento lobbyist to orchestrate a lobbying
and public relations effort to defeat the Costa bill. But Roberti's warnings had proven
accurate. The pro-rent control forces lacked the organizational infrastructure and grassroots
constituency to mount a serious opposition effort. It was easy for legislators to vote for a
bill that would only significantly affect the small cities of Santa Monica, Berkeley, West
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Hollywood, Cotati, and East Palo Alto, the only cities with even a modicum of grassroots
tenant activism. According to one organizer of the pro-rent control coalition, they considered
passage of the Costa/Hawkins bill a "done deal." Their efforts to stop it was viewed as a
"last gasp." Seventeen years after the post Proposition 13 groundswell of pro-rent control
tenant activism, the legislature was able to pass a statewide pre-emption bill with almost no
political fallout.
 
Mobile Home Rent Control
Since 1985, bills to weaken rent control in California have carefully exempted
mobile homes. This is no accident. In contrast to the tenants movement, residents of mobile
homes have been well organized and able to defeat efforts to weaken protections. Mobile
home park owners lack the political clout of their counterparts in the real estate industry. As
a result, rent regulations affecting mobile homes is widespread and shows little signs of
weakening.
Mobile home owners occupy an unusual status. They own their homes, but they rent
the spaces in mobile home parks. Compared with apartment tenants, they are actually less
mobile, because of the size and cost of moving their structures. Thus they have a major
stake in opposing rent increases and organizing for rent control. 
The number of mobile homes in California increased during the l980s as a result of
rising housing prices. There are 375,000 mobile homes in California parks with about one
million residents. Mobile home owners pushed for local rent control.131 The first wave of
mobile home rent control activity coincided with the general post Proposition 13
groundswell for rent regulation. For example, San Jose adopted rent control for mobile
homes in 1979.132 But unlike the efforts of apartment tenants, the momentum for mobile
home rent control persisted in the l980s and early 1990s.133  Today, about 140,000 to
250,000 live in rent controlled parks. Eighty-nine cities and counties have adopted mobile
home rent control in the state.134.
Mobile home owners are older and are "faithful voters." They have their own
political lobby, the Golden State Mobilehome Owners League.135 It h s 80,000 members
statewide, from big cities to small towns.136  Led by Jeffrey Kaplan, the owner of several
mobile home parks, park owners formed the CA Mobilehome Parkowners' Alliance in
1988.137 Over the years, they have mobilized local and statewide ballot measures, and
worked through the legislature, to abolish rent control for mobile homes.138
In 1995, Sen. Raymond Haynes (R-Riverside) filed a bill, on behalf of the Alliance,
to exempt mobilehome parks from rent control. Haynes had received significant campaign
contributions ($7,500) from park owners.139 The bill went nowhere. The Alliance then
bankrolled the petition drive for the anti-rent control ballot measure in March 1996.140 Prop
199, on the March 26, 1996 ballot, would have voided and phased out local rent control
laws for mobile homes.141 As one news report explained, "Owners went to the initiative
after years of losing battles in the Legislature." The mobilehome park owners outspent the
tenants by 3-1 in the Prop 199 battle: $1.6 million to $489,000, most of it in small $25 and
$50 contributions from tenants.142  A later article put the figures at $2.1 million vs.
$320,000.143 The mobile home residents were well-organized. They engaged in protest
rallies, candidates nights, letters-to-editor of newspapers, guest columns, and other forms
of protest and electoral mobilization. The residents personalized the opposition campaign by
focusing on Kaplan.144
A number of major daily newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times, San Jose
Mercury News, and the Sacramento Bee, ditorialized against Prop 199. The Bee's ditorial
reflected its ambivalence about rent control. "Rent control usually creates more problems
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than it solves -- but there are compelling reasons why this measure should be defeated."145 
Supporters of Prop 199 included mobile home park owners groups, the state Republican
Party and Republican legislators. Opponents included mobilehome owners groups, the
AARP, the Congress of California Seniors, the state AFL-CIO, and the state Democratic
Party.146 Opponents also included 14 counties and 85 cities.147 City Councils in small and
large cities voted to oppose Prop 199.148 Prop 199 lost by 61% (3.1 million) to 39% (1.98
million.)149 Ironically, the spokesman for the Yes on 199 campaign, Denis Wolcott, which
spent about $2.1 million, said "the money is simply not there," to run an effective
campaign.150 During l994 through 1996, anticipating the state law, a number of cities and
some counties passed mobile home rent control laws.151 
Comparative Analysis
What are the key factors that explain the dramatic turnabout in the fortunes of rent
control in Massachusetts and California? Changes in housing market dynamics in the two
states cannot explain the change in policy, since there was no significant change during the
period under discussion here. Rather the key factors are political and ideological. 
Influence of Real Estate Industry
It is difficult to exaggerate the political influence of the real estate industry, fueled by
a combination of political contributions and grassroots networks. For years, the various
components of the industry -- apartment owners, developers, realtors, managers and lenders
-- worked together to oppose rent control and other tenant protections. This persistence and
unity eventually paid off. Even when the industry lost some battles, it persisted in fighting
the long-term war over rent control, refining its ammunition and, when necessary, calling
for reinforcements. These industry organizations and their staffs developed close ties to
legislators at the state and local levels over the course of several decades. They have the
staying power to persist in waging their efforts year after year. The deregulation victories in
1994 and 1995 should be seen as part of this long-term process, not a sudden reversal of
fortune.
In both states, the real estate industry is one of the most powerful political lobby
groups in the state legislature. In Massachusetts, it is one of the six more generous
industries in terms of PAC campaign contributions and lobbyists' personal contributions to
state legislators.152 In California, the California Real Estate PAC was the sixth largest
contributor ($649,800) to legislative campaigns during the 1991-92 election cycle. From
1983 through 1993, the Real Estate PAC was among the ten largest PAC donors each year,
ranking as high as third during the l987-88 election cycle.153  Costa was one of the
industry's favorite beneficiaries.154 Other industry trade associations and individuals are
major donors.  Still as one California real estate lobbyist noted, "If it had just been `juice,'
we would have gotten rid of rent control a long time ago." Other factors opened a window
of opportunity for the housing industry to get the Costa bill through the legislature.
In Massachusetts, the Greater Boston Real Estate Board played the role of
coordinating the industry's activities, with strong support from the Massachusetts
Association of Realtors and others. In Massachusetts, the emergence of the SPOA,
representing small property owners, could have undermined the industry's unity, but quite
early in the Question 9 campaign, SPOA and the GBREB joined forces, linking the
ideologically-driven SPOA with the more pragmatic GBREB. In fact, the emergence of
SPOA helped shape the public debate in ways that helped define the GBREB as "moderate"
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and its legislative efforts as a "compromise." The SPOA's willingness to engage in protest
tactics helped make the "abuses" of Cambridge's rent control a newsworthy story and draw
attention to the issue. The fact that it was landlords, not tenants, engaging in protest was to
journalists the equivalent of "man bites dog." The SPOA lacked the political resources to
carry out a statewide strategy, so its fragile alliance with the major real estate industry
proved useful, even though some of SPOA's members considered the legislative solution a
"sell out." 
In California, the California Housing Council, formed in the l970s to represent the
large apartment owners and managers, worked closely with the California Apartment
Association (which represents smaller property owners), the Building Industry Association,
and California Association of Realtors, and others. The lobbyists for these groups meet
once a week "to compare notes."155  A split between CAA (representing small apartment
owners) and CHC (large landlords) in California emerged in the late l980s when there was
little likelihood of defeating rent control, but this split was resolved in the mid-l990s when,
according to a CHC lobbyist, "we realized it wasn't possible to get rid of it entirely" and
CAA accepted the need to compromise.156  Echoed another lobbyist: "It took awhile for
small owners to concede that we should settle for something short of the complete
elimination of rent control."157
The influence of the real estate industry goes beyond its campaign contributions to
local and state public officials. The financial resources of the real estate industry have been
used to constantly put its opposition on the defensive. As a result, tenants organizations
have constantly had to organize to protect the status quo from further erosion of tenant
protections. With their considerable financial resources, the CHC and the Greater Boston
Real Estate Board sponsored ballot measures or introduced anti-rent control legislation at the
state or local levels that kept tenant groups busy and in a reactive mode. They also kept
filing lawsuits challenging the legality of various tenant protection laws and then appealing
them if and when they lost in lower courts.  This served to sap some of the strength and
persistence of tenant organizations. It also turned so-called "tenants rights" struggles into
complex legal, technical, and legislative maneuvers.
Moreover, the real estate industry is well-organized at the national level. State and
local real estate organizations can draw on the experience, expertise, and resources of
national bodies and each other. For example, in both states, national real estate industry
trade associations and firms have contributed money to support anti-rent control ballot
measures, including the Question 9 campaign. Also, national real estate groups have spent
several decades hiring academics to conduct studies that criticize rent control as a public
policy, while tenant groups generally lack the resources to sponsor comparable research,
and disseminate these studies to state and local groups to use in their battles against rent
control. The findings of this research, repeated often enough, becomes the "conventional
wisdom" among academics. There is now a cadre of academic experts that the industry uses
to testify before legislative bodies and to speak to the media. For example in the late l980s,
when the Los Angeles City Council was considering renewing (and even strengthen) its rent
regulations, the CHC brought Brookings Institution's Anthony Downs, who had written a
report against rent control sponsored by a coalition of national real estate industry groups, to
Los Angeles to talk to Council members and staff, the media, and industry officials. In
support of the Costa-Hawkins bill, the CAA and CHC brought several academics to
Sacramento to testify against rent control, summarizing their studies that had been paid for
by the industry. During the Question 9 campaign, the GBREB hired two academics to
conduct studies to support the anti-rent control arguments. 
Finally, the real estate industry was effective at mobilizing its constituency when its
leaders thought doing so was necessary. As one real estate lobbyist explained, the realtors,
landlords, and developers view this behavior as part of their business activities and
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spending money for political influence as a business expense. Unlike some other highly-
concentrated industries, real estate has many small- and medium-size firms among
landlords, realtors, and developers. For example, the California Association of Realtors
alone has over 100,000 members.158 The industry's professional lobbyists catalyze this
constituency to write letters to newspapers and politicians, arrange group meetings with
elected officials, and attend public hearings.
Weakness and Fragmentation of Tenant Constituency
Even in the best circumstances, the pro-rent control forces in both states faced
overwhelming odds when facing off against the organized power of the real estate industry.
If the tenant groups had any chance of preserving rent control, they would have had to
mobilize their "natural" constituency of protected tenants and marshall strong support from
their "natural" allies among seniors, labor, housing groups, and other "liberal"
constituencies. In neither state did the tenant organizations achieve this level of self-
organization. The tenant constituency was weak, fragmented, and politically isolated. By
the 1990's, the pro-rent control forces were no longer a protest movement.
They had become an interest group, and a narrow one at that.
Although renters represent a majority of the population in most major cities, they
represent a minority in the larger population of both Massachusetts and California. Even
more important, the number of tenants who would be directly affected by the loss of rent
control was a relatively small subcategory of all tenants. In both states, rent control
exempted public housing, private developments with project-based subsidies from federal
and state government, and units with Section 8 vouchers and certificates. In Massachusetts,
in particular, this represents a sizable proportion of the residents of rental housing. In the
Boston area, too, the housing stock consists of many two- and three-unit owner-occupied
buildings, whose tenants are also exempt from rent regulations. In Cambridge, for example,
half of all renters were exempt from rent control.159 In California, the Costa-Hawkins bill
carefully excluded mobile homes, thus eliminating another potential ally in the fight to
preserve rent regulations. 
One could reasonably argue that the real estate industry had already
won the war against rent control when, during the l970s, it used its political
muscle to limit what it called "extreme" or "radical" rent control to a handful
of cities in both states. Moreover, in California the Costa-Hawkins bill did not seek to
abolish all rent regulations. It allowed cities to adopt or maintain vacancy decontrol
provisions. As a result, tenants in the major cities which already had vacancy decontrol --
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Jose, among them -- would not be directly
affected. Only renters in the small cities of Santa Monica, West Hollywood, Berkeley, East
Palo Alto, and Cotati stood to lose protections. In Massachusetts, Question 9 sought to wipe
out all rent regulations and the subsequent legislation did the same. But only Boston,
Cambridge, and Brookline would be affected by this change in policy, and, by 1994, only
Cambridge still had full rent control. Landlords in buildings with decontrolled units in
Boston and Brookline, which represented the vast majority of units, had already pushed
rents to market levels when units became vacant. Although these tenants in Boston were still
helped by the "grievance" system, it did not provide the same degree of protection as those
handful of tenants who remained in rent controlled apartments. Tenants in those
decontrolled apartments had little immediate stake in mobilizing to oppose the real industry's
deregulation efforts.
The tenant organizations in Massachusetts and California had been seriously
weakened by the 1990s. One Massachusetts tenant organizer explained that tenants had
become "complacent" about the protections they had. A California housing activist used the
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same word in describing the status of tenant organizing there. Since the demise of CHAIN,
tenants groups were "very poorly organized" and "very fragile," he said. The handful of
lobbyists in Sacramento that work for low-income housing groups are "disconnected" from
any "organized base."
Effective tenant organizing would incorporate a combination of electoral work,
lobbying, and protest activity. In both states, existing tenant organizations lacked the
capacity to mount much more than token mobilization efforts. During the l970s, tenant
activists in both states had helped organize rent strikes, large rallies and demonstrations, and
occassionally civil disobedience. These activities have two functions. They help solidify the
morale and expand the base of the tenant constituency. They also can help catalyze support
from third parties (such as the media), a topic discussed below. By the late l980s, tenant
groups in both states had ceased engaging in this kind of protest activity. Landlords did not
feel sufficiently threatened to negotiate directly with tenants or indirectly through elected
officials.
The Massachusetts Tenants Organization had turned into an advocacy organization
rather than a organization capable of large-scale electoral mobilization and mass protest.
Funded by foundation grants, with only a handful of staff, few volunteers, and high
turnover among leadership, MTO primarily engaged in counseling tenants about their rights
and testifying at public hearings. As noted above, tenant groups in Cambridge could
mobilize around periodic crises and regular elections, but they relied on a handful of
volunteer activists. They had no staff, no strong membership base, and no second-tier
leadership. The Brookline Tenants Union, which during the l970s and 1980s wielded
substantial influence in town government, lost influence in the early 1990s when many of its
endorsed candidates were defeated for Town Meeting and real estate forces in the town
weakened the local rent regulations. In Boston, many of the neighborhood-based tenant
organizations -- in the Fenway, Back Bay/Beacon Hill, Allston-Brighton, and elsewhere --
had ceased to exist or became empty shells, when key leaders withdrew and funding dried
up. The situation in California was even more problematic. The statewide tenants group,
CHAIN, had collapsed in the mid-l980s. So had the Campaign for Economic Democracy,
Tom Hayden's statewide consumer group. The major tenants rights group in Los Angeles,
the Coalition for Economic Survival, only had three or four staffpersons who devoted their
work primarily to organizing residents of HUD-subsidized projects. Organizations of
private housing tenants in San Francisco, Oakland, and other major cities had gone through
a similar process of decline. Tenant organization in Santa Monica, Berkeley, East Palo Alto,
and West Hollywood looked similar to that in Cambridge. Groups could mobilize around
election cycles to preserve their regulations, but lacked strong leadership or mass
membership.
The passage of Question 9 and the subsequent legislation in Massachusetts led to a
flurry of tenant organizing and protest, including threats of rent withholding, but these
efforts were episodic and politically ineffective.160  Ironically, it was the small property
owners in Cambridge, through SPOA, that utilized these tactics to mobilize opposition to
rent control.
In other words, by the time Question 9 and the Costa-Hawkins bill came along, the
tenant constituency was already in a weakened state and unable to mount an effective
opposition campaign. Both real estate industry leaders and pro-rent control activists share a
common assessment of the state of tenant organizing in the 1990s. One California real estate
lobbyist gives credit to Tom Hayden and others, who recognized rent control as an
"excellent organizing issue" during the l970s and l980s. "He [Hayden] outworked the other
side." But with David Roberti in a position to protect rent control, "the rent control forces
never had to assert themselves" and became "complacent."161  The r al estate industry
strategists calculated that by the 1990s, "They [rent control forces] don't have a constituency
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any more. It's just a few activists. Rent control used to be a good political organizing issue.
That's going away now."162 A Massachusetts real estate lobbyist had a similar assessment:
Tenant groups in the Boston area "don't have the army" they had in the 1980s.163 
The deregulation efforts in 1994 and 1995 owe their success, at least in part, to the
general decline of tenant organization during the prior decade. In addition, one can see, at
least in hindsight, that the pro-rent control forces made some strategic errors in mounting
their campaigns to preserve rent control in both states. In Massachusetts, the tenants made
what one real estate lobbyist calls a "fatal mistake" to think that Boston, Cambridge and
Brookline would deliver a 70% or 80% margin against Question 9. Another error was to
organize much of their anti-Question 9 campaign as a defense of the principle of "home
rule." "Our polling showed that this didn't resonate with voters."164 In California,
according to one housing activist, the pro-rent control forces took Nick Petris' vote for
granted, and were shocked when he cast a key vote in favor of Costa-Hawkins.
External Resources: Money and Allies165
From the "resource mobilization" perspective, a significant factor was the tenant
organizations' inability to marshall external resources in the form of money, allies, and
sympathetic media coverage. According to one former tenant organizer, now a lobbyist for
low-income housing, explained, "We don't have the money to spend on organizing the
base."166 A real estate industry lobbyist acknowledged the obstacles to organizing renters:
"It's tough. How do you get a mailing list of tenants? It's difficult to do."167
Most tenants are low- or moderate-income. Real estate industry claims to the
contrary, a majority of tenants living in regulated apartments fall into these categories. Even
if they have the capacity to recruit members and collect dues -- itself a complex and labor-
intensive task -- it is very difficult for organizations with low- and moderate-income
constituencies to sustain themselves with dues from members. Thus, if tenant organizations
are to hire staff, rent office space, publish and mail newsletters, and undertake the other
tasks required of grassroots organizations, they have to attract money from "outside"
sources. Since the early 1980s, this has proved increasingly difficult to do.
Many of the grassroots community and tenant organizations of the l960s and l970s
received funds from a variety of federal programs, such as VISTA, CETA (the job training
program), and others. When President Reagan took office in 1981, a top item on his agenda
was to "defund the left" -- to withdraw federal funds from groups engaged in liberal
advocacy and organizing. This had a direct affect on tenant organizing. A former leader of
CHAIN, California's statewide tenant organization, acknowledged that the organization was
"never terribly strong." Even in its post-Proposition 13 heyday, it was comprised primarily
of a nucleus of activists but "no real membership base." It was always essentially a
"letterhead organization" with only "one staffperson and some VISTAs." When, after the
Reagan policies took affect, "the VISTAs ran out" and "CHAIN disappeared." The Reagan
administration also eliminated the CETA program (which provided staffpersons for tenant
and similar organizations) and cut the federal budget for the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC). It also sharply restricted LSC's authority to engage in "advocacy" activities and
work with grassroots organizations. LSC had been a key source of legal support for tenant
organizations in both states. As their budgets was cut and their hands tied, agencies such as
the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and Greater Boston Legal Services had a harder
time providing the legal support for organized tenants in terms of negotiating with landlords,
organizing tenant unions, appearing in housing court, and other activities. 
To the extent that, during the Bush and Clinton administrations, the federal
government funded tenant organizing, it was exclusively in federally-subsidized
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developments, particularly under the various HOPE programs sponsored by HUD to help
create resident management organizations and to help residents assume ownership of
subsidized projects. Because there was money to be had for organizing (typically defined as
"technical assistance"), a number of key tenant organizations in the two states shifted their
priorities from organizing residents of private apartments (the constituency for rent control)
to organizing the low-income residents of subsidized housing.  In Massachusetts, the
Boston Affordable Housing Alliance converted itself to the HUD Tenants Alliance.
Massachusetts Tenants Organization shifted some staff resources to organizing residents in
federally-subsidized  "expiring use" projects. In California, the Coalition for Economic
Survival, a major catalyst for rent control in the Los Angeles area, changed its priorities
toward organizing residents of HUD-assisted buildings.  
During the l980s, the major philanthropic foundations concerned with the problems
of affordable housing and urban poverty began to shift their grantmaking away from
community and tenant organizing. Indeed, their ambivalence about funding groups involved
in organizing and confrontational tactics goes back to the civil rights and anti-poverty
movements of the l960s.168  Starting in the early l980s, as the shortage of low-income
housing and the increasing visibility of homelessness became public issues, mainstream
foundations began to expand their interest in these problems, primarily by funding non-
profit community development corporations (CDCs) engaged in the development of low-
income housing. Many of these CDCs grew out of tenant and community organizing
groups. As foundations changed their grantmaking priorities, however, these organizing
groups began to divert their attention toward "bricks and mortar" development and pay less
attention to organizing.169 Most foundations did not consciously seek to "co-opt" grassroots
activist in favor of development, but their funding priorities had that effect. Statewide
groups such as CHAIN and the Massachusetts Tenants Organization, and local tenant
groups such as the Symphony Tenants Organizing Project in Boston and the Coalition for
Economic Survival in Los Angeles experienced the decline of foundation funding support
for organizing activities.
Thus, when confronted with a major assault on rent regulations in the 1990s, the
tenant organizations were organizationally unprepared to respond. To be effective, though
would have had to dramatically expand their collaboration with their "natural" allies who
could help mobilize the money, volunteers, and voters. Unfortunately for the tenant forces,
these "natural" allies provided to be elusive and did not provide the resources that would
have been necessary to mount a winning defense against the rent deregulation forces.
In both states, pro-rent control forces generated a long list of groups that officially
opposed the Costa-Hawkins bill and the Question 9 ballot measure. These included what
one housing activists called the "usual suspects" (housing groups, labor unions, senior
citizens groups, liberal politicians, consumer groups, and others) as well as a few
organizations and individuals who were not among the "usual suspects" crowd. "On paper,
we had everybody and anybody," explained the sole staffperson of the anti-Question 9
campaign. But when it came to providing money or volunteers, "it was pretty
sparse...Tenants were mainly on their own."170In California, where geographic distance
makes it difficult for groups across the state to work together in any event, the "allies"
situation was even more problematic.
What could these allies have done? They could have sent mailings to members,
lobbied state legislators through phone calls or letter writing, written letters to local
newspapers, donated money, mobilized volunteers to do office work, staffed phone banks,
participated in get-out-the-vote efforts, or participated in rallies and public hearings. Who
were these potential coalition partners? They include the following:
o Tenants in Subsidized Housing and Mobile Homes. Heskin describes the
emergence of "tenant consciousness" in California in the post-Proposition 13 period.171 The
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recent experience of tenant self-help efforts in California as well as Massachusetts suggests
that, at least in the 1990s, "tenant consciousness" was highly segmented into narrow
"interest group"-like politics. In California, residents of mobile homes have traditionally
supported rent control not only for themselves, but for tenants in private apartments. As
noted above, the GSMOL has been a well-organized and effective lobby for mobile home
rent control. GSMOL officially opposed all the Costa bills and the Costa-Hawkins bill in
1995. But it failed to mobilize its members around this legislation. Groups working to
organize tenants in HUD-subsidized and public housing projects -- which are exempt from
local rent control172 -- also officially opposed Costa-Hawkins and Question 9, but did not
mobilize these residents around these issues. Groups working with tenants in public
housing also officially endorsed the pro-rent control efforts, but did not participate in
mobilization efforts. 
o Housing and Homeless Advocacy Groups. In both states, groups that work on
low-income housing issues could have been expected to join the battle to defend rent
control. Few did so. In Massachusetts, for example, the most respected housing advocacy
group, the Citizens Housing and Planning Association, which lobbies for state-funded
housing programs, remained neutral on Question 9 because, according to one of its board
members, its board included major developers and development attorneys. Organizations
that advocate for the homeless -- such as the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless and
the Los Angeles Coalition Against Homelessness, endorsed the efforts against Costa-
Hawkins and Question 9, but did not actively participate on the steering committees or
mobilize their constituencies.  For the most part, the network of community development
corporations (CDCs) in both states remained on the sidelines around rent deregulation. The
major CDC trade associations, Massachusetts Association of CDCs and the Southern
California Association for Non-Profit Housing, official endorsed the efforts to defeat Costa-
Hawkins and Question 9, but their staffs did not actively participate in the campaigns. In
Boston, two CDCs -- the Fenway CDC and the Allston-Brighton CDC -- played an active
role in the anti-Question 9 campaign. Both groups had emerged out of tenant activism, their
neighborhoods faced with gentrification and condo conversions in the l980s, and their staffs
and board members predisposed toward political activism. The West Hollywood CDC
played a similar role in California, but the many CDCs in San Francisco and Los Angeles
stayed on the sidelines.
o Seniors, Unions, and Consumer Groups. Massachusetts Senior Action, the
California Congress of Senior Citizens, both state AFL-CIO organizations,173 and many
individual unions official endorsed the tenants' efforts to protect rent deregulation. The
heads of the state AFL-CIOs testified at hearings and participated in press conferences. They
did not, however, mobilize their unions' financial resources (except for token contributions)
or their members to oppose Costa-Hawkins or Question 9. Similarly, community
organizations in California, such as ACORN, the Industrial Areas Foundation network, and
Concerned Citizens of South Central -- whose constituencies were composed primarily of
low-income renters -- did not mobilize around the Costa-Hawkins bill. Neither did the
consumer-oriented Public Interest Research Group in either state use their considerable
lobbying networks.
In the case of the Massachusetts campaign against Question 9, more money alone
might have made a critical difference, given the narrowness of the ballot measure's victory.
As described above, the SOCC group operated on a shoestring budget with only one
staffperson, no funds for TV commercials, no funds to sponsor research studies, and only
limited funds to do polling and distribute literature. Had Question 9 been defeated, it is
unlikely that SPOA and the GBREB would have had the political momentum to defeat rent
control in the state legislature. In the case of the legislative fight over Costa-Hawkins in
California, money alone for more staff probably would not have changed the outcome,
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given the weakness of the tenant constituency compared with the real estate lobby.
Other factors involving allies played a role in the victories for the Costa-Hawkins bill
and Question 9 and its legislative twin. For example, in California, rent control's biggest
political supporter, David Roberti, was forced to retire, while there was no doubt that a
Republican Governor would sign any anti-rent control bill on his desk. In Massachusetts,
rent control's biggest political supporter, Boston Mayor Ray Flynn, left office in July 1993
to become U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican, while Gov. Michael Dukakis, who lived in
Brookline and would not have signed an anti-rent control law, had been replaced by
libertarian Republican William Weld. In Massachusetts, rent control lost a crucial ally when
Kirk Scharfenberg, the liberal editorial director of the B st n Globe who had kept the
paper's reporting and editorializing sympathetic to tenant issues, died in September 1992.
These personnel changes made a difference in the pragmatic political maneuvering that led to
rent deregulation.
Legitimacy
Rent control supporters lost the Costa-Hawkins and Question 9 battles primarily
because they were outgunned by the real estate industry's superior financial and political
resources. There are no public opinion polls to gauge changes over time in rent control's
favorable and unfavorable ranking, so it is impossible to say with certain how the "public"
feels about this policy. But there is little doubt that the real estate industry was successful in
discrediting
the very idea of "rent control" took a beating as a public policy to address housing problems
-- if not among the general public, then at least among opinion leaders and elected officials.
Rent control has always been controversial, even during World War 2 when it was
imposed to address the housing shortage and help the war effort. During the l970s,
however, rent control was viewed as a policy to protect vulnerable tenants from rising rents
and arbitrary evictions perpetrated by "greedy" landlords. By the 1990s, the real estate
industry had succeeded in repositioning, if not completely discrediting, rent control in the
public debate. It argued that rent control had become a policy that protected undeserving
affluent tenants and abused small property owners. 
This did not occur overnight or by accident. It was part of a long-term effort by the
real estate industry. Moreover, it occurred in a broader political environment in which
"active government" itself came under assault. During the l970s and l980s, corporate
America engaged in an ideological assault on government activism174. This exacerbated and
reinforced public skepticism about the capacity of government to solve social and economic
problems. Indeed, it directly challenged the role that government had played in the private
economy. Rent control was a weapon in this battle. It became a convenient symbol of the
excesses of government regulation.
The Question 9 ballot measure took place on the same day in November 1994 as
what one real estate lobbyist called the "Republican revolution in Congress" which brought
a GOP majority in both Houses and led to the elevation of Cong. Newt Gingrich as Speaker
of the House.175 The campaign around the Costa-Hawkins bill in l995 occurred soon after
Governor Pete Wilson had been re-elected and Californians had voted for Proposition 187
(to restrict illegal immigration) and defeated Proposition 186 (to enact "single-payer" health
care reform). 
In other words, the changing public mood toward government itself might be
considered the "background noise" in the rent control battle. Real estate and tenant groups
then sought to position or "frame" rent control in ways that would win public sympathy. In
the current political climate, however, real estate groups had the ideological upper hand.
Moreover, they were able to mobilize their substantial resources to take advantage of this
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situation. As one tenant activist explained, the industry helped frame the issue so that "rent
control was seen as the ultimate big government solution"176 in a period when "big
government" was not a term of endearment.
As noted above, the real estate industry over the years has used a number of
arguments to attack rent control, but most recently that have sought to emphasize their claim
that it does not help -- in fact, it hurts -- the poor. The industry effectively co-opted the
message of rent control advocates by arguing that it primarily benefits affluent renters at the
expense of the poor, the elderly, and minorities. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the closely-
knit network of conservative think tanks and publications promoted the notion that local rent
regulations led to an increase in homelessness. This idea was not only picked by the
mainstream media but used by conservative members of Congress and HUD Secretary Jack
Kemp to back legislation to withhold federal HUD funds to localities with rent control.177
This persistent drumbeat of negativism toward rent control had a cumulative effect.
According to a California real estate lobbyist, "After 10 or 12 years of fighting rent control,
I think we could make a compelling argument that this form of rent control did not fulfill its
goals. In fact, it had negative impacts. We had studies and census data and experts who
could tell this story."178
This public relations effort played up the image of affluent professionals --
"yuppies" -- monopolizing rent controlled units and living in "subsidized" apartments,
while, in effect, shutting out more needy renters. The image of West Hollywood, Santa
Monica, Cambridge, and Brookline as havens of yuppie affluence reinforced the real estate
industry's propaganda. On the eve of the Costa-Hawkins and Question 9 showdowns, the
California Housing Council and the Greater Boston Real Estate Board both sponsored
studies that claimed to demonstrate that cities with rent control had seen a decline in the
number of minority or low-income residents and/or that residents living in regulated
apartments were not primarily low-income. Although these studies had serious
methodological flaws, the real estate industry was able to widely disseminate their findings,
while tenant advocates flailed away, trying to find academics to poke holes in the studies'
statistical methods. Perhaps even more importantly, the real estate industry was able to
"humanize" this point by identifying some high-profile individuals living in rent regulated
apartments. In Massachusetts, the names of Cambridge Mayor Ken Reeves and Supreme
Judicial Court Justice Ruth Abrams repeatedly appeared in the news media as examples of
the "abuses" of rent control. "I'm forever grateful to Ken Reeves," said Ed Shanahan of the
Rental Housing Association and the GBREB.179
Real estate interests were so successful at injecting this view into the public debate
that news columnists and elected officials repeated it as if it were a truism. Sen. Ray Haynes
(R-Riverside) was quoted as saying, "Rent control deprives the young and the old of
affordable housing."180 Upon signing the bill, Gov. Wilson called it "a fundamental issue
of fairness for both property owners and those who have artificially been denied access to
quality housing."181 Even a Boston Globe editorial opposing Question 9 repeated the canard
that in "Cambridge, the rent control ordinance has indeed been abused by middle-class
tenants to can afford to pay market rents."182In fact, those few newspaper editorials that
opposed Costa-Hawkins, Question 9, and Proposition 199 (to abolish rent control for
mobile homes) tended to echo the Gl be's view that while rent control itself was
problematic, this approach was too blunt an instrument. The tenant groups and their
sympathetic politicians had no effective retort to these statements.  Even the head of the
MTO-led effort was reduced to the defensive posture that rent control is "not a perfect
system" and that only a handful of tenants who live in regulated apartments are rich.183
The real estate industry had learned to use the phrase "extreme" or "radical" rent
control to describe the laws in Cambridge, Santa Monica, West Hollywood and
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Berkeley.184 By this they meant that it did not allow vacancy decontrol and that it posed a
particular hardship for small property owners, who were characterized as "Mom and Pop"
landlords. Both the news media and many elected officials picked up this jargon. It helped
to frame the issues so that "vacancy decontrol" became defined as the "moderate" or
"compromise" version of rent control.  The real estate industry cleverly anointed small
property owners as the public face of the deregulation campaigns. When they needed people
to testify at hearings, to appear on television, or to be interviewed by reporters, they had a
battery of small property owners with "horror stories" to tell. Interviewees in both
California and Massachusetts used the same word -- "poster child" -- to identify the
individuals who became the representatives of the anti-rent control forces. One real estate
industry lobbyist referred to SPOA's Denise Jillson as a "great poster girl." A California
tenant activist acknowledged that the landlords had "good poster children" from Santa
Monica, Berkeley, and West Hollywood.
In retrospect, some (though not all) housing activists acknowledge that the very
strict rent control regulations in Cambridge, Santa Monica, West Hollywood, and Berkeley
may have played into the hands of rent control's opponents. In particular, they cite
regulations in Cambridge that prohibited some condominium owners from living in their
own units, and regulations in Berkeley that allowed the rent board to require large rent
rollbacks because small property owners had misunderstood some technical regulations. No
doubt all of these examples can be justified legally and technically by rent board staff and
rent control supporters. The point of the tenant activists is that these examples provided
ammunition for their opponents -- examples of government "abuse" that ordinary people
could identify with. One Massachusetts tenant activist acknowledges that during the
Question 9 campaign, some Brookline and Boston tenant activists thought that "those
Cambridge tenants ruined it for all of us" by failing to correct some of the more stringent
aspects of that city's rent control law. He noted that it was no accident that the backlash
against rent control was strongest among small property owners in Cambridge, not
Brookline and Boston. A California tenant advocate acknowledged that Berkeley's strict rent
control system "pissed off even some sympathizers," most importantly, Senator Nick
Petris. None of these people favored eliminating full rent control in favor of vacancy
decontrol. But they argued that by not treating "Mom and Pop" landlords (small property
owners) differently, cities with strong rent control gave the real estate industry ammunition
to use against rent control and helped ignite the SPOA rebellion in Cambridge. Also, as
noted earlier, the real estate industry was able to stigmatize "radical" rent control by
associating it with the unconventional reputations of Berkeley, Santa Monica, West
Hollywood, and Cambridge.
As noted earlier, the news media, for the most part, framed the battles over rent
control in ways that undermine the tenants' perspective. The controversy was a constant
source of news in the local Santa Monica, Berkeley, Cambridge, and Brookline
newspapers, but it was only irregularly covered in the major dailies such as the Boston
Globe, Boston Herald, Los Angeles Times, San Jose Mercury-News, San Francisco
Chronicle, and others. The Boston papers paid only sporadic attention to the Question 9
campaign until the last weeks. It then covered the battle in the state legislature as an "inside
politics" fight, focusing on the roles of Governor Weld and the key legislators. The Globe
did offer some "human interest" stories, equally balancing the hardships of tenants with
those of small property owners. The Boston press paid no attention to the financial
contributions of the real estate lobby, or the close connections between SPOA and the major
real estate groups; indeed, it emphasized the split between SPOA and GBREB rather than
their symbiotic relationship. In comparison, however, the major California media virtually
ignored the battle over the Costa-Hawkins bill. As one housing activist noted, the issue was
"not on their screen." By 1995, the mainstream media was "tired of rent control as an issue.
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They viewed it as an 'old' issue." California's major newspapers reported the key votes on
Costa-Hawkins, but did not cover the legislative maneuverings or the potential
consequences of its passage. It was viewed almost entirely as a political story. Not
surprisingly, most of the stories about the Costa-Hawkins battle emanated from their
bureaus in Sacramento, the state capital, far from where deregulation would have the most
impact. (Sacramento does not have any form of rent control). It is not surprising that the
battle over rent control received more coverage in Massachusetts than in California. In
Massachusetts, Boston is the state capital, the major media market, and the geographic area
where all rent control battles have taken place.   
Consequences of Deregulation
Rent deregulation began January 1, 1995 in Massachusetts and a year later in
California. Too little time has passed to thoroughly analyze the impact of these policy
changes on housing markets and on housing consumers. Moreover, both laws were
designed to be gradually phased-in, so the full implementation and consequences of
deregulation were postponed for several years. There has certainly been an increase in
housing hardship in the localities that experienced rent deregulation. But there have been no
systematic studies of housing conditions in either the Boston metropolitan or Los Angeles
metropolitan areas, or in any of the submarkets in which rent deregulation took place. Even
if such studies existed, however, it would be difficult to separate the impact of rent
deregulation from other factors such as cuts in federal and state housing studies, state
welfare reform, immigration, population growth or decline, and other demographic forces. 
It is reasonable to argue that rent deregulation had already taken
affect in California and Massachusetts by the late 1970s or early l980s. In
other words, the major cities in both states had already adopted vacancy
decontrol policies. Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, and Oakland
adopted vacancy decontrol from the beginning. Boston had rent control for
five years before it was changed to vacancy decontrol.  Other major cities --
Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford, Fall River, San Diego, San
Bernadino, and others -- and most suburbs and small towns never adopted
any reform of rent regulations on apartments.
By the mid-1990s, only about 75,000 units out of 4.6 million rental
units in California (in Santa Monica, West Hollywood, Berkeley, East Palo
Alto, and Cotati) and about 40,000 units out of 915,617 rental units in
Massachusetts (in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline) were under rent
control. This is a extremely small proportion of the rental housing stock in
both states.1 8 5 The real estate industry had already won the rent control
war. Question 9 and the Costa-Hawkins bill were the final battles in a war
of attrition.
An examination of the "impacts of deregulation," therefore, must be viewed in this
context. San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Jose never adopted strong rent controls.
Their vacancy decontrol laws meant that all apartment units would eventually reach market
levels and that market forces, not government regulation, set rent levels.186  Th  impact will
be small because the overall number of units affected is so small. For example, the real
impacts of deregulation in Boston began in l976, when vacancy decontrol initially took
affect and the number of units under rent control fell from about 100,000 to 22,000 in less
than a decade.
Former Boston Mayor Kevin White once compared rent control to a tourniquet. He
viewed it as a response to an emergency situation -- in effect, to stop the bleeding and allow
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the body (or the housing market) to heal itself. A Boston housing activist described the
impact of deregulation with another metaphor about bleeding. He said:
"Some people expect the end of rent control to lead to blood in the streets. 
That won't happen.  It won't happen all at once, so you won't see the pain.  
It will be a slow bleed. It won't be easy for reporters to write about, because 
it won't be dramatic, it won't happen to lots of people at the same time, it 
will be partly hidden from public view. But that doesn't mean it isn't happening. 
There will be lots of pain and suffering, but it will happen over months and years."
Whether or not this statement is exaggerated or melodramatic, it points to an
important distinction in understanding the consequences of deregulation. Even if we could
isolate the impact of deregulation from these other factors, any analysis of this question
must separate (a)  the immediate or short-term impact on existing or sitting tenants fr m (b)
the longer-term impact on the housing market, particularly the availabi ity of affordable
housing. 
Immediate Impact on Sitting Tenants
Most of the media coverage and public debate over deregulation focused on the
potential hardship that would affect renters in regulated apartments once these regulations
were lifted.In particular, media coverage and public debate focus on low-income and elderly
renters. How high would landlords raise rents? Would tenants have much higher rent-to-
income ratios? Would tenants face eviction and displacement? Was there a sufficiently high
vacancy rate to absorb displaced tenants at reasonable rent-to-income ratios? Would tenants
be able to remain with reasonable proximity to their previous apartments in order to maintain
access to work, family, friends, health and social services, religious institutions and other
networks. Would the prospect or reality of these changes affect the physical or emotional
health of renters?
With the exception of Santa Monica and Berkeley, none of the cities with any form
of rent control know very much about the characteristics of residents who live (or lived) in
regulated apartments: age, income, rent-to-income ratio, health status, place of work, and
other variables. None of these cities have conducted systematic surveys of how these renters
were affected by deregulation to answer the questions posed above. Thus, we are left with
indirect indicators and impressions to evaluate the short-term impacts on sitting tenants.
To some extent, both laws mitigate against dramatic impacts by phasing-in the
implementation of deregulation. As noted earlier, this phasing-in was a matter of some
controversy even within the ranks of the real estate industry groups. The large landlords and
developers successfully argued for a phase-in period to avoid draconian consequences and
media "horror stories." 
Massachusetts
The Massachusetts law did not go into effect all at once. Some tenants lost
protections immediately, while others had a one- or two-year delay.187 The imp ct in
Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline differed depending on their age, income, physical
disability, the size of their building, and whether they were in a rent controlled or
decontrolled unit. 
For example all tenants in Boston's 63,000 decontrolled units -- including elderly,
low-income, and disabled -- faced an immediate end to rent regulations in January 1995. In
these units, once renters moved out, the Rent Equity Board had regulated rent increases,
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evictions for "just cause" and condominium conversion. The Rent Equity Board had no data
on the number of low-income, elderly, or handicapped renters living in these units. 
Low-income, elderly, and handicapped tenants in the 22,000 rent controlled
apartments had one- or two-years worth of protections, depending on the size of their
buildings. About 8,000 units lost rent control protections after the first year (as of January
1, 1996), and the remainder lost protections a year later.188 Rent control ended for all units
on January 1, 1997.
There was no immediate political uproar after the law began to take effect.
Informants attribute this to several factors. First, the law was phased-in gradually, so that
regulations were not all lifted simultaneously. There were essentially three phases of the
decontrol process -- starting with all tenants in decontrolled units and all tenants not in
protected categories in rent controlled apartments (who lost all protections immediately),
followed by elderly, low-income, and handicapped tenants in rent controlled units in small
buildings, followed by elderly, low-income and handicapped tenants in large buildings.
While many low-income and elderly renters in the 63,000 decontrolled units in Boston (and
their counterparts in Brookline and Cambridge) lost protections right away, they were
scattered in many buildings and neighborhoods. There was no critical mass of tenants facing
immediate rent hikes and evictions under the same roof. Second, tenant groups were unable
to mobilize tenants facing immediate rent hikes and evictions -- in part because the
individuals were so spread out and in part because they lacked the resources to identify and
organize them. Third, the local news media did not pay significant attention to the
aftershocks of rent control until the first phase of deregulation, and then they focused
primarily on the fate of specific elderly renters rather than the impact of deregulation on the
overall housing market. Fourth, the GBREB and its RHA did an effective job of persuading
the news media that landlords would hold the line on rent increases for vulnerable
tenants189. The RHA identified a few examples where landlords limited rent hikes for
elderly tenants in the second and third phases of deregulation. The RHA recognized that
Mayor Menino wanted to look as though he had convinced landlords to be reasonable and
agreed to appeal to its members to "work with" tenants facing hardship. The RHA claimed it
"worked closely with the Menino administration to weave a multi-layered safety net."190
These factors allowed the real estate industry and its allies to claim that tenants'
predictions of the dire consequences of deregulation were exaggerated. For example, in
April 1996 Globe columnist Jeff Jacoby wrote, "It is 18 months since Question 9 was
approved. Rent control is more than 95 percent phased out. There has been no crisis, no
emergency, no upheaval, no explosion of evictions."191
The Boston Globe provided anecdotal evidence of how landlords and tenants were
reacting to the immediate or gradual phase-out of rent regulations. One story reported that,
according to the head of the Massachusetts Tenants Organizing saying that its phone was
"ringing off the hook lately with complaints about landlords raising rents."192 The paper
reported landlords raising rents in various orders of magnitude: from $493 to $650193; from
$315 to $450 and from $179 to $700194; from $425 to $900195; from $469 to $572, from
$465 to $575, and from $560 to $975196; from $300 to $800197; from $576 to $875, from
$304 to $750, and from $158 to $950198; and from $159 to $650199. A Globe columnist
recounted the tale of three senior citizens, between 85- and 87-years old, facing eviction by
an absentee landlord from apartments they'd occupied for almost 50 years.200 Other storie ,
however, told of landlords limiting rent increase for vulnerable tenants or of landlords
relieved to be able to raise rents on affluent tenants who had been paying rents far below the
market level.
As the law went into effect, there was considerable confusion regarding who was
and was not eligible under the new law. The city government, tenant organizations, and
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local media tried to provide information. The city government had little to offer renters in the
63,000 decontrolled units facing rent increases and evictions. "They'd say, "what rights do
I have?' and I'd say, "you don't have any rights,'" explained the director of Boston's rent
control agency. "I had to deliver a lot of sad news. It's a terrible situation."201  
Boston's city government waited almost a year after the legislature passed the law to
begin a telephone survey of the residents of rent controlled units. Many tenants, especially
the elderly, were "in denial," according to several informants. They did not contact the city
agency to have their income, age, and disability eligibility verified.202 As of October 1995,
only 700 of the 22,000 (3%) households had qualified for extended protections.203 In
contrast, 9% of Cambridge's 16,000 rent control households and 12% of Brookline's 4,200
households qualified, in part because both cities did more aggressive outreach to renters.204
But most informants believe that even these figures significantly minimize the number of
eligible renters in rent controlled units.205
Housing groups in the three cities pushed local governments to develop a plan to
assist tenants facing hardship.206 Boston tenant groups proposed a plan to provide property
tax abatements to landlords who agreed to limit rent increases and to provide city subsidies
to tenants facing rent increases and eviction. Mayor Menino rejected this proposal.207 He
initially refused to direct any of the additional property tax revenues expected from
deregulation to housing assistance. Instead, the city government's response was to give
priority to low-income and elderly tenants facing eviction from deregulation in the allocation
of 250 federal Section 8 certificates, to reorganize the Rent Equity Board into a counseling
agency called the Rental Housing Resource Center, and to lean on the RHA to urge
landlords to be reasonable with rent increases and evictions.208 Right before the third phase
of decontrol was to begin, and under pressure from senior citizen organizations and
community groups, Menino pledged $2 million in city funds (from the city's Housing Trust
Fund, a depository for linkage funds, which had been used to support affordable housing
development)209 to provide rent subsidies for poor elderly tenants about to lose their
protections.210
In Cambridge, the City Council voted to target a portion of the increased property
tax revenue expected from deregulation to expand the stock of subsidized housing. City
officials estimated that property tax revenues would increase by about $4 million; they
allocated at least $2 million a year over five years towards housing programs. The funds
would be used to help tenants purchase homes (with the city attaching resale restrictions to
maintain long-term affordability) and for the city to purchase condominium units to add to
the inventory of public housing. Cambridge housing officials decided not to use these funds
to provide housing vouchers on the grounds that they would not add to the inventory of
permanently affordable housing and because they feared that landlords would simply raise
rents, forcing the city to spend even more money to subsidize tenants. In addition, the
Cambridge Housing Authority is giving preference in its public housing units to eligible
tenants displaced by deregulation.   
There are some indirect indicators of hardship from the immediate deregulation faced
by the majority of tenants, and during and after the two-year phase-in period facing the
minority of tenants. These include the following:
o In 1996, Boston rents increased by 14%, from $880 to $912 for a typical
apartment.211 
o During that year, the rental vacancy rate for market-rate apartments dropped to 1%;
in Brookline it dropped to 0.7%.212 
o Boston's 1995 census of homelessness found 5,299 homeless people, a 10%
increase from the previous year. 
o In January 1995, the Boston Housing Authority had 21,600 applicants on its
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waiting list as well as 14,000 applicants for 200 federal rental certificates.213 Both the BHA
and the Cambridge Housing Authority closed their waiting lists because they were so long.
o Both the Boston and Cambridge housing authorities are finding it more difficult to
place tenants with federal Section 8 vouchers and certificates in private apartments because
market rent levels are now much higher than the Section 8 Fair Market Rents (FMRs) set by
HUD. 
o The number of tenants contacting the Massachusetts Tenants Organization seeking
assistance increased "dramatically" after the law initially went into effect in January 1995
and jumped again after the full deregulation took effect in January 1997.
California
The Costa-Hawkins bill took effect in January 1996 but its implementation is phased
in over three years. It permits cities to employ vacancy decontrol (with re-control). In other
words, it deregulates rental housing gradually as tenants vacate apartments voluntarily or for
non-payment of rent. (In contrast, the Massachusetts law deregulated all rental housing
within two years. Also, unlike the Massachusetts law, Costa-Hawkins has no means-test
provision). Under Costa-Hawkins, landlords will be allowed to increase rents, no more
than twice between 1996 and 1999, but the greater of 15% above the then-existing
Maximum Allowable Rent (MAR), as set by local rent control boards, or an amount such
that the total rent does not exceed 70% of the Fair Market Rent (FMR) in Los Angeles
County, as set by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Beginning
January 1, 1999, rent increases on vacated units will be deregulated. So long as tenants
currently (as of January 1996) in rent controlled apartments remain in these units, they will
continue to be subject to rent control -- in other words, landlords will be allowed to increase
rents as approved by the Rent Control Board.
The Costa-Hawkins bill will not eliminate the re-control provisions in Los Angeles,
San Francisco, and several other cities with vacancy decontrol, but it will primarily affect
those cities with full rent control. These include Santa Monica (86,000 population, 68%
rental units, 28,200 rent controlled units), West Hollywood (36,118 population, 88% rental
units; 19,300 rent control units) Berkeley (102,724 population, 48% rental units, 21,000
rent controlled units), East Palo Alto (23,452 population; 53% renter units; 2,700 rent
control units), and Cotati (6,455 population, 600 rent control units). From a statewide
perspective, the overall number of units under rent control is quite small, but in each city the
number represents a substantial proportion of its housing stock. The impact will not be felt,
however, all at once. Tenants will be protected by rent control as long as they stay in their
units. 
One immediate consequence of Costa-Hawkins, at least in Santa Monica, is the
decline in the number of rental units available for renters with Section 8 certificates and
vouchers. Prior to Costa-Hawkins, landlords in Santa Monica were eager to accept Section
8s because the Fair Market Rents (FMR) were often higher than the allowable rents under
rent control and units were exempt from rent control so long as they had Section 8s. Once
Costa-Hawkins passed, the number of landlords willing to accept Section 8s has dwindled.
In fact, some landlords are holding units vacant until January 1, 1999 (when all rent
regulations are eliminated) rather than rent to new tenants, including Section 8 holders.
Current FMRs for the Los Angeles/Long Beach area, which includes Santa Monica, are
$675 for a one-bedroom apartment, $854 for a two-bedroom apartment, and $1153 for a
three-bedroom apartment. If landlords are willing to forgo these rent revenues, it suggests
that market rents in Santa Monica are even higher.214
In terms of short-term impact, a major concern is the threat that landlords now have
an incentive to encourage tenants to vacate units so they can be free of rent regulations.
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Some tenant activists warned that the Costa-Hawkins bill will lead landlords to harass
tenants to vacate their rent controlled apartments. Staff at the Santa Monica rent board and
several legal services attorneys indicated that, indeed, they have knowledge of such
increased harassment, but they were unable to quantify the magnitude of the increase. Santa
Monica passed an anti-harassment law in July 1995 to address this threat.215  
The impact of deregulation in Santa Monica and other rent control cities depends on
the rate of turnover of regulated units. Between January 1996 (when the law took effect)
and May 5, 1997, landlords of over one-fifth (6,354) of the approximately 28,200 rent
controlled units in Santa Monica had already registered a vacancy and applied for a vacancy
rent increase. Of these, 790 were filing for their second vacancy.216
A survey of Santa Monica households found the following:
"Average incomes of households in rent-controlled units are significantly
lower than households in uncontrolled units and below those of tenants in
rent-stabilized units in West Los Angeles. Median household income for tenants
in rent-controlled units is $27,000, compared with a median of $42,500 in 
non-controlled units. In West Los Angeles in 1992, median income for households 
in rent stabilized units was $32,500. Adjusting for inflation, there has been a
decline in real median income among households in controlled units between
1986 ($30,623 in 1994 $) and 1994 ($27,500)."217 
The survey found that almost three-quarters of the households in rent controlled
apartments meet federal guidelines for low- and moderate-income. Tenants in Santa
Monica's rent controlled units stay in their units longer than those in other units. They also
have lower rent-to-income ratios. Even so, almost half (45%) of households in rent
controlled units were paying more than 30% of their incomes for rent, despite the fact that
their rents were considerably below the market level.218 Impressionistic evidence from
knowledge sources in Boston and Cambridge suggest a comparable profile of tenant in rent
controlled units and compared with renters in nearby cities.219 When these tenants move --
assuming their incomes do not dramatically increase and that they remain in the Los Angeles
area -- it is very likely that they will pay higher rents and have higher rent-to-income ratios.
Impact on Availability of Affordable Housing
What will be the long-term impact of deregulation on the overall housing market,
particularly the availability of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households? 
It is a certainty that as deregulation takes effect, rents in the deregulated apartments will rise
-- the only question is, how much? A related question is whether, as rents levels in the
deregulated apartments increase, landlords will raise rents in the non-regulated sector to their
"equilibrium" level? Another question is whether deregulation will trigger a significant
increase in new rental construction and, should this take place, whether the addition of these
new apartments will stabilize the rental market to some "equilibrium" level? These questions
cannot be answered with much certainty, but we can identify some key trends, indicators,
and impressions from informed sources that allow us to make some tentative forecasts.
During much of the 1980s, the Boston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco areas were
among the hottest housing markets in the nation. Indicators include both the pace of price
increases and the  absolute price levels. The rental market paralleled the home sale market in
these three metropolitan areas.220 During that decade, these areas consistently had among
the highest rents in the country.221 These three areas were among the "least affordable" of
all metro housing markets, measured by the gaps between median incomes (or wages) and
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housing prices (and rents), such as the quarterly reports from the National Association of
Realtors' housing affordability index. A 1987 analysis of wage/home price ratios in 49
metro areas found Boston the least affordable area, followed by Anaheim, Hartford, New
York, Providence, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles.222 Ranking 44 metro areas
in terms of the proportion of renters paying more than 30% of their income for housing in
1989, San Diego ranked first (57.7%), San Francisco ranked second (54.1%), Miami/Ft.
Lauderdale (53.9%) ranked third, Los Angeles ranked fourth (52.8%), San Jose and
Minneapolis/St. Paul (both  50.7%) tied for fifth, and Boston (49.8%) ranked seventh. One
study in the late l980s calculated that it would cost $106 million a year to provide every low-
and moderate-income renter household in Boston with enough subsidy to bring the rent
down to 30 percent of household income.223  
Case argues that the housing boom in these areas was due as much to psychological
as economic factors -- sellers, buyers, and agents, along with the media, contributed to
bidding wars for housing.224 Sooner or later this speculative bubble was bound to burst.
Around l989, in both the Boston and Los Angeles housing markets, prices began to decline.
Even so, their absolute levels were still among the highest in the nation and during the
housing recession, prices did not go back to pre-boom levels. Both regions experienced an
economic recession that exacerbated the housing "bust." Housing prices in the Bay Area
followed a similar pattern. Despite the recessions, housing affordability levels did not
improve, because incomes for low- and moderate-income households fell along with rent
levels. As a result, in 1990 Los Angeles and San Francisco central cities had among the
highest proportions of low-income renters with severe rent burdens (defined as housing
costs that are 50% or more of household income). The Boston figure was not among the top
primarily because it had a very high proportion of federal- and state- subsidized housing
apartments compared with other cities.225 Among those renters in nonsubsidized
apartments, the proportion with severe rent burdens was considerably higher than most
other cities.
By the mid-l990s, both Boston and Los Angeles emerged from recession and
housing prices began to increase, while price levels in other California housing markets,
including Bay Area and the Silicon Valley (San Jose area), began to rise significantly.226  A
study of 1995 rent levels in major metro areas ranked San Francisco first, followed by
Washington, Los Angeles, Boston, San Diego, and New York. The ranking of median
home prices found San Francisco first, followed by Boston, New York, San Diego, and
Los Angeles.227 A 1995 study of the least affordable metro area markets for single-family
homes ranked San Francisco first, followed by Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York,
Oakland/East Bay, Boston, San Diego, and San Jose.228 A 1996 study of rental
affordability -- comparing median renter income with Fair Market Rents -- found that more
than half of renters in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas, and close to half in the
Boston area, were unable to afford rental housing.229 
Immediately after deregulation in Massachusetts took effect -- between February
1995 and February 1996 -- average rents for market-rate units in Boston rose $100 (13%),
from $802 to $903. Vacancy rates fell sharply, from 4.5% to 1.8% in the city of Boston and
from 4.2% to 1.4% in the Boston metro area. Vacancy rates in private assisted apartments
(with state or federal subsidies) was 0.7%.230 A year later, rents averaged $917, with the
vacancy rate at 1.67%. In the metro Boston area, average rents were $940 and the vacancy
rate was 1.34%.231 In other words, people uprooted by deregulation in Boston -- and, in
general, low-and moderate- income households seeking rental housing -- had few places to
look within the city or in the surrounding area. Comparable figures for Santa Monica and
other rent control cities, or the Los Angeles and San Francisco metro areas, were not
available. In 1996, rents in San Francisco rose 24% in the 15 months after January 1995. In
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May 1996, the city's rental vacancy rate was about 2%. Surveys revealed that San Francisco
rents (an average of $1105 at the end of 1995) were the highest in nation except in
Manhattan.232 Data from Los Angeles suggest that low-income households displaced from
Santa Monica or West Hollywood will have difficulty finding affordable housing in Los
Angeles, where overall vacancy rates are low, affordable housing is scarce and increasingly
at risk, and rent-to-income ratios far exceed national averages.233  
A review of the state's housing market at the end of 1996 indicated that "rents went
through the roof this year and by year's end there were few if any rooms at the inn, let alone
apartment complexes."234 At least one California real estate official fears that there could be
a renewed interest in rent control, especially in "hot" housing market areas like the Santa
Clara Valley.235 Renters in Milpitas pushed the City Council for rent control.236 Tenants in
Cupertino, where some rents increased 30% at once, started a tenants union and circulated a
petition for rent control.237   
In this context, the deregulation of rental housing is likely to have a significant
impact on the availability of affordable housing in the target cities and on the future
demographic composition of these cities and their neighborhoods. This statement is based
on some key facts. In general, residents of rent controlled and rent regulation apartments
have lower incomes than residents of non-regulated apartments. Indeed, the majority of
tenants in rent controlled units in California fall within the low- and moderate-income
categories. Moreover, the profile of renters in these cities reveals a higher proportion of
low- and moderate-income households, a lower median income, a higher proportion of
seniors, and lower rent-to-income ratios than in adjacent cities without rent control.238 (For
example, the average Santa Monica household in a rent controlled apartment pays 28% of
household income for rent compared with 37% for households in uncontrolled units.239 
The apartments lost to the rent control inventory represent about 12% of Boston's
housing stock, 37% of Cambridge's housing stock, and 20% of Brookline's housing stock.
In Santa Monica, the 28,000 rent controlled units represent about 60% of the city's housing
stock. One study estimates that by 2003, between one-half and three-quarters of Santa
Monica's rent controlled stock will be decontrolled. Given projected rent increases, these
will no longer be affordable to low- and moderate-income households. Among those units
that do turn over once between 1996 and 1999, average rents are expected to increase
between 23% and 25%. By 2003, cumulative rent increases are predicted to increase
between 46% and 48%. Even within the remaining stock of rent controlled apartments,
allowable rent increases under the Costa-Hawkins formula could reduce the proportion of
units affordable to low-income households from 45% in 1995 to 24-30% by 2002.240 
Apartments in East Palo Alto currently rent for about half what they cost in neighboring
cities. According to a member of the East Palo Alto rent stabilization board, the Costa-
Hawkins law "means East Palo Alto will be gentrified..."  Within ten years, "East Palo Alto
will look like Palo Alto," a much more affluent city.241
 Other factors suggest an intensification of competition for rental housing in the
Boston area, the Los Angeles area, and the San Francisco area, a trend that will push rents
higher. All three metro areas are experiencing population growth. Moreover, the supply of
subsidized housing is at risk due to federal housing policy changes. Boston, in particular,
has a large inventory of Section 8 developments and other developments facing expiration of
low-income use restrictions.242  In both Massachusetts and California, state housing
programs have been contracted since the late l980s; state housing finance agencies are not
sponsoring new rental housing construction in either state. At the same time, changes in
federal welfare policy will reduce the incomes of many low-income households. Rising rent
levels and the reduction of subsidized housing will make it even more difficult for low-
income households to find affordable housing.  
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Some argue that a significant increase in new rental housing construction could
offset these trends. Rent deregulation has seen an increase in rehabilitation and remodeling
of existing rental units in Boston, Cambridge, and Santa Monica, but there has not been any
significant increase in construction of rental housing since the deregulation laws took effect
in both areas.  According to the mayor's housing policy advisor in Boston, developers claim
that they need rent levels of about $2,000 to make the investment sufficiently profitable and
that, with the exception of a few downtown neighborhoods, the Boston housing market has
not reached that level.243 Perhaps a rental housing construction boom will emerge, but it has
not yet been seen. Moreover, what new construction is currently in the pipeline is almost
entirely market-rate and luxury apartments. There is much debate among housing experts
about the so-called "filtering" process -- whether an increase in rental housing at the upper
tier of rents loosens the rental housing market in older units. There is considerable evidence
that an increase in market-rate and luxury housing may have the opposite impact -- leading
to "filtering up" (gentrification) rather than "filtering down."
The most likely scenario is that housing affordable to low- and moderate-income
households will decline both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the rental housing
stock in cities where rent control has been or is in the process of being eliminated. As a
consequence, rent-to-income ratios for existing244 and future renters will increase. This will
have an importance beyond the household or the housing market; it will mean that renters,
with less discretionary income, will spend less on other goods and services, including basic
necessities such as food and clothing as well as other items. This will have a negative impact
on the larger economy as the effective demand for non-housing goods and services declines.
One can expect an increase in overcrowding as tenant households facing rising rent-to-
income ratios and lower vacancy rates respond by doubling-up. Even with rising rent-to-
income ratios and increased overcrowding, it is likely that the number of low- and moderate-
income households will decline in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the populations
of formerly rent controlled cities. These communities will lose some of their economic and
social diversity. The bonds of "community" -- reflected in social ties -- may begin to
diminish. It is impossible to put a price-tag or to quantify this aspect of a city's quality of
life.
Appendix:
Arguments For and Against Rent Control
There is much debate about the short-term and long-term consequences of rent
control.  While advocates argue that rent controls are necessary to keep rent increases in line
with tenants' incomes, opponents counter that in the long run controls will contribute to the
very crisis they seek to address.  By lowering profits, it is argued, rent controls will
ultimately lead to lowered investment in rental housing: new construction will cease,
maintenance will decline, and even homelessness will result.  Worse, it is argued, rent
control does not even reach those lower-income tenants who need it most, primarily
benefitting upper-income tenants. These arguments provide the principal rationale behind
efforts to restrict the ability of localities to enact rent control -- to "pre-empt" local
governments regulating rents. 
There's much academic and political debate about these topics, most of which have
been subject to empirical tests. Unfortunately, much of the debate around rent control is
based on hypothetical arguments rather than empirical research that examines the
experiences of communities that have enacted rent control programs.  Thus, there are many
myths about rent control that inhibit a healthy public discussion about its pros and cons. In
fact, there has been considerable empirical research on the impact of rent control. Quite a
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few of these studies have been sponsored by various real estate industry organizations.
Studies conducted by independent researchers, however, conclude that rent control does not
have adverse consequences for new construction, maintenance, and other measures of the
level of investment in rental housing.245  But these studies do not diffuse the controversies,
since the various sides appear to be talking past each other. Indeed, both sides tend to view
these studies as "ammunition" to use in their lobbying and public relations efforts. Not
surprisingly, the real estate industry has greater resources to invest in academic studies, so
most of these reports emphasize the negative consequences of rent control.
Some people may support rent control as a "last resort," but believe that providing
needy people with rent subsidies is a more efficient way to help house people who really
need it. Unfortunately, less than one-third of all households eligible for federal rent
subsidies receive them. Providing rent subsidies to all low-income households who are
currently paying over 30% of their income in rent (the accepted "affordable" housing
guideline) would cost at least an additional $50 billion. One study of Boston in the late l980s
found that providing subsidies to all low- and moderate-income households who were
paying more than 30% of their income in rent would cost $150 million a year. Further, the
real estate industry, the major opponents of rent control, have not been active supporters of
efforts to increase federal housing subsidies for the poor. Moreover, rent control advocates
argue that it is more cost-effective for taxpayers than providing direct subsidies. One recent
study estimated that if Santa Monica, West Hollywood, and Berkeley abandoned their rent
control program, it would cost the state's taxpayers about $160 million a year simply to
maintain the existing levels of affordability provided by rent control.246 
Some people mistakenly believe that rent control freezes rents and makes it
unprofitable to own rental housing. In fact, every rent control system provides for annual
across-the-board rent increases tied to the cost of living or cost increases. They all also
provide for individual rent adjustments to ensure landlords a "fair return" on their property,
although definitions of "fair return" vary. These adjustments allow rents to keep pace with
increasing costs and to allow landlords to make capital improvements. Landlords are
assured of making a reasonable profit. Rent control, in this view, simply limits rent gouging
and speculation.
Some argue that rent control leads landlords to defer maintenance. Experience
reveals that it doesn't, because in order to receive a rent increase, local rent control laws
require landlords to maintain their properties in accordance with health and safe code
regulations. As a result, rent control actually encouragesbetter maintenance. More of the
tenants' rent goes toward building maintenance in cities with rent control than in cities
without it.
Some argue that rent control lead landlords to abandon their buildings. Common
sense and hard reality suggests otherwise. In California, for example, Santa Monica and
West Hollywood have the strongest rent control laws in the state, but there are almost no
abandoned apartment buildings in either city.  Nor do these rent control cities have the blight
of foreclosed apartment buildings owned by banks and federal government agencies (such
as the FDIC and RTC) that is common in much of California. The same story was true in
Cambridge and Brookline, Massachusetts, when these cities had very strong rent control
regulations.
Real estate groups argue that rent control discourages builders and banks from
investing in new rental housing. In fact, almost all rent control laws exempt new
construction. No jurisdiction has suggested that it would ever reverse this commitment.
Many cities with rent control have experienced an ncrease in apartment construction during
the past decade. In Santa Monica alone, about 1,000 apartments were built between l987
and l993.
Rent control's critics claim that it mainly helps "yuppies" and other affluent tenants
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who "hoard" the apartments. As a result, they say, rent control hurts the elderly, the poor,
and people of color, who really need rental housing but are "locked out" of the rental market
because units are occupied by those who do not need below-market housing. Some have
even gone so far as to argue that rent control causes homelessness for these reasons.  The
real estate industry can certainly point to a few upper-income people living in these
apartments -- anecdotes they use to make their point. But these are the exceptions, not the
rule.247 And to focus on these exceptions is ironic, if not hypocritical, because it is
landlords decide who will rent their units.  But, in fact, rent control encourages economic
and social diversity. The vast majority of renters living in apartments covered by rent control
laws are low- and moderate income and/or elderly households.  
In the most recent analysis, Allan Heskin and his colleagues at UCLA carefully
examined neighborhoods in East Palo Alto, Berkeley, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood
(all cities with vacancy control) and compared them with comparable neighborhoods in
adjacent cities without vacancy control.  Their study demonstrates that in the four California
cities with the strongest rent control laws, the mix of renters -- including the elderly, the
poor, and people of color -- remained relatively constant between l980 and 1990.  Without
rent control, low-income tenants, and people on fixed incomes, would face constantly rising
housing costs. Many would face displacement. The most important implication of the
UCLA report is that rent control promotes community stability and an economically.
racially, and socially diverse population mix.
The real estate industry complains that rent control is complex to administer and gets
mired in bureaucracy.248 In fact, with proper compliance by landlords, rent control is very
simple to administer. With the advent of computers, rent control is even simpler to
implement. In Santa Monica, for example, costs have not varied by more than $2/unit per
month in the last five years.   Most of the expense is due to landlords refusing to comply
with the law or mounting extensive administrative and legal challenges to its operation. Even
so, in Santa Monica, tenants pay the full cost of rent control. In West Hollywood and Los
Angeles, tenants and landlords split the cost. In Santa Monica, landlords who want a rent
increase beyond the annual general adjustment simply have to submit an application listing
their expenses and income. Even the cost to landlords of getting professional help is
included in the rent increase.  Full pass-throughs for earthquake-related improvements have
been put on a simplified fast track (30-60 days) basis.
Some argue that rent control is not needed because housing prices and rents are no
longer escalating as they did in the l980s. Indeed, during the early 1990s housing prices and
rents in some housing markets actually declined and vacancy rates rose, making it easier for
low-income renters to find affordable housing. In fact, the recession made things even
worse. Lay-offs and unemployment make many families' housing situation even more
precarious.  Where rent levels declined, it was almost entirely at the high end of the rental
market. Similarly, most vacant apartments were in the expensive units. Meanwhile, in the
Boston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are housing markets (even before the earthquakes
that shook Los Angeles and the Bay Area), waiting lists for subsidized apartments were
long and growing. Now, these waiting lists have expanded even more. One symptom of
this shortage is the rise in homelessness, especially among families with children. Before
the earthquake, an estimated 60,000 people were homeless in the Los Angeles area alone.
Among Los Angeles' homeless population, an estimated 40% are families, as many as a
third are employed, and over a third are veterans.
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